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1. Introduction
Until recently, the on-going legal discussions about ‘Brexit’, the United Kingdom’s 
upcoming withdrawal from the European Union (EU), have predominantly focused 
on the requirements and consequences of the withdrawal procedure set out in Arti-
cle 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)1. A hitherto neglected, though argu-
ably no less important question concerns the effect, if any, that a withdrawal from the 
EU will have on the UK’s membership in the European Economic Area (EEA)2: 
Given that the EEA extends many aspects of EU membership beyond the EU’s bor-
ders, resulting in a Common Market ‘light’, a future UK membership in the EEA 
could – at least from a European business law point of view – effectively result in 
‘business as usual’, as a significant share of EU law would continue to apply to UK 
companies, albeit in form of EEA law.
Against this background, it is interesting to note that legal analyses of Brexit gen-
erally assume that the UK’s EEA membership will be terminated ipso iure, should 
the UK decide to withdraw from the EU.3 According to this view, the UK subse-
quently could (re-)apply for EEA membership should its government so choose, with 
such an application having to be accepted by all remaining EEA Contracting Parties 
– an option commonly referred to as the ‘Norway option’4 in reference to Norway’s 
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1 OJ C 326, 26 October 2012, 1.
2 On the EEA, see in more detail below at 2.
3 See, inter alia, House of Commons Library, Research Paper 13/42, 19; Marc-Philippe Weller, 
Chris Thomale and Nina Benz, Englische Gesellschaften und Unternehmensinsolvenzen in der Post-
Brexit-EU, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2380 (2016); The Law Society of England and Wales, The 
EU and the Legal Sector 6 (October 2015); Alexander Wolff, Europäische Betriebsräte nach dem Brexit, 
Betriebs-Berater 1784 (2016); Christoph Bode, Jan Bron, Barbara Fleckstein-Weiland, Marcus Mick and 
Manfred Reich, Brexit – Tax it?, Betriebs-Berater 1367 (2016); Sarah Garvey, Karen Birch and Maeve 
Hanna, Brexit – Legal Consequences for Commercial Parties, 3 (May 2016); Jean-Claude Piris, If the 
UK Votes to Leave, Centre for European Reform, January 2016, at 4.
4 Marc Seeger, Die Folgen des „Brexit“ für die britische Limited mit Verwaltungssitz in Deutsch-
land, Deutsches Steuerrecht 1817 (2016); Richard North, The Norway Option, Re-joining the EEA as 
an Alternative to Membership of the European Union (The Bruges Group 2013); Swati Dhingra and 
Thomas Sampson, Life after BREXIT: What are the UK’s Options outside the European Union?, Center 
for Economic Performance, CEP Brexit Analysis 4 (2016); Wolfgang Münchau, Brexit: The Norway 
Option is the Best Available for the UK, Financial Times, 28 June 2016; Peter Spence and Szu Ping 
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status within the EEA. The present article challenges the underlying (and often merely 
implicit) assumption that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will automatically result 
in its withdrawal from the EEA, given that the EEA Agreement is a separate interna-
tion al treaty subject to separate legal rules governing withdrawals and effects of pos-
sible changes in EU membership. It argues that a withdrawal from the EU will in fact 
not affect the UK’s continuing EEA membership,5 as long as the UK does not volun-
tarily choose to also withdraw from the EEA.6 It then analyses the post-Brexit situa-
tion under the EEA Agreement by addressing its practical application to a number of 
different areas,7 as inter alia the free movement of UK companies within the EEA, 
the future of the ‘European passport’ for UK credit institutions and investment firms, 
as well as the free (but possibly restrictable) movement of workers in the EEA.
2. The EEA Agreement and the United Kingdom
The Agreement on the European Economic Area8 (EEA Agreement) was signed on 
2 May 1992 and first entered into force on 1 January 1994. The EEA Agreement was 
subsequently amended on a number of occasions, most recently through the Agree-
ment on the participation of Croatia in the European Economic Area of 11 April 
2014.9 It is currently in force between 32 Contracting Parties, namely the EU (as suc-
cessor to the European Community (EC))10, each of its currently 28 Member States 
(including the UK), and the three Member States of the European Free Trade Asso-
ciation (EFTA) Iceland, Liechtenstein and Nor way. (In contrast, the fourth current 
EFTA Member State – Switzerland – is not a Contracting Party to the EEA Agree-
me nt.)
2.1. The European Economic Area
According to Article 1(1) of the EEA Agreement, its aim is to promote a continuous 
and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Contracting 
Parties with equal conditions of competition, and the respect of the same rules, with 
a view to creating a homogeneous EEA. Like the TFEU, the EEA Agreement guar-
antees free access to the European internal market, in particular, by establishing cer-
Chan, Safe Harbour: Why the Norway option could take the risk out of Brexit, The Telegraph, 28 June 
2016.
5  See 4. below.
6  See 3. below.
7  See 5. below.
8  OJ L 1, 3 January 1994, 3.
9  OJ L 170, 11 June 2014, 5; EEA Supplement No 58, 9 October 2014, 1.
10 Article 1 No. 2(b) of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty of European Union and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community of 13 December 2007 (OJ C 306, 17 December 
2007, 1) (‘Lisbon Treaty’) introduced today’s Article 1(3) of the TEU, according to which the EU suc-
ceeded and replaced the EC.
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tain fundamental freedoms.11 These freedoms include the free movement of goods 
(Articles 8–27 of the EEA Agreement), the free movement of workers (Articles 28–30 
of the EEA Agreement), the right of establishment (Articles 31–35 of the EEA Agree-
ment), the freedom to provide services (Articles 36–39 of the EEA Agreement) and 
the free movement of capital (Articles 40–45 of the EEA Agreement).
In addition, legal ac ts of EU secondary law are incorporated into EEA law by mak-
ing them part of the Annexes to the EEA Agreement. EU law referred to or contained 
in these Annexes or in decisions of the EEA Joint Committee12 is binding upon the 
EEA Contracting Parties and forms, or shall be made, part of their internal legal order 
(Article 7 of the EEA Agreement), a continuous task that has been aptly described as 
‘mirror legislation’.13 Between 1994 and 2010, 7,464 EU regulations, directives, deci-
sions or other legal acts have been incorporated into EEA law in this manner.14
Despite the similarities just described, the EEA is marked by a significantly lesser 
degree of integration than the EU, and a corresponding larger degree of independence 
of its Member States. In the early stages of the EEA’s development, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (ECJ) characterised the EEA as being ‘established on 
the basis of an international treaty which, essen tially, merely creates rights and obli-
gations as between the Contracting Parties and provides for no transfer of sovereign 
rights to the inter-governmental institutions which it sets up.’15 More recently, the 
EFTA Court16 has d escribed the EEA Agreement as ‘an international treaty sui generis 
which contains a distinct legal order of its own’,17 thereby employing an expression 
more similar to the ECJ’s famous description of the EEC Treaty in its 1964 landmark 
11 Silja Vöneky and Britta Beylage-Haarmann, Art. 217 AEUV, in Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf 
and Martin Nettesheim eds, Das Recht der Europäischen Union para. 73 (56th suppl.; Munich; Beck 
2015); Waldemar Hummer, Sonderbeziehung EG-EFTA, in Manfred Dauses ed, EU-Wirtschaftsrecht 
paras 116–118 (6th suppl.;.Munich; Beck 1997); Karin Fløistad, Fundamental Rights and the EEA 
Agreement, ARENA Report No 1/2004, January 2004; see also Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, EEA-
Agreement and EC Law: A Comparison in Scope and Content – Overview on the Basic Legal Link 
between Norway and the European Union, in Peter-Christian Müller-Graff and Erling Selvig eds, The 
European Economic Area – Norway’s Basic Status in the Legal Construction of Europe, 18–20 (Berlin; 
Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag 1997).
12 See in more detail about the EEA Joint Committee below at 5.2.1.
13 Carl Baudenbacher, Between Homogeneity and Independence: The Legal Position of the EFTA 
Court in the European Economic Area, 3 Columbia Journal of European Law 176 (1996–97); Thomas 
Burri and Benedikt Pirker, Constitutionalization by Association? The Doubtful Case of the European 
Economic Area, Yearbook of European Law 3 (2013).
14 The European Economic Area and the Single Market 20 Years on, EFTA Bulletin 42 (Septem-
ber 2012).
15 ECJ, Opinion 1/91 of 14 December 1991 [1991] ECR I-6079, para. 20 – EEA Agreement.
16 On the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association States (the ‘EFTA Court’), see 
in more detail 5.2.2 below.
17 EFTA Court, Advisory Opinion of 10 December 1998, Case E-9/97, para. 59 – Erla María 
Sveinbjörnsdóttir v. Iceland; see also Takao Suami, EU Law, EEA Law and International Law – The 
Myth of Supranational Law and Its Implications for International Law, in The EEA and the EFTA Court 
534–5 (EFTA Court ed.; Oxford and Portland; Hart 2014).
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decision Costa v. ENEL.18 In any case, there is general agreement that, in comparison 
to EU law, the depth of integration of the EEA Agreement is less far-reaching,19 as 
its legislation is less invasive and as it exempts certain business-related areas entirely. 
In particular, the EEA Agreement does not cover a number of the EU’s policies, as 
e.g. the Common Agricultural Policy, the Common Fisheries Policy, the Common 
Trade Policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy or Justice and Home Affairs.20
2.2. The United Kingdom as EEA Agreement Contracting Party in its own Right
It is an important feature of the EEA Agreement that, on the ‘EU side’, it neither 
comprises only the EU nor only its Member States as Contracting Parties, but rather 
the EU and each of its individual Member States. The Preamble of the EEA Agree-
ment and the legal definition of the term ‘Contracting Parties’ contained therein make 
th is entirely clear.
On the ‘EU side’, the EEA Agreement – in categories of EU law an association 
agreement in the sense of Article 217 of the TFEU21 – was concluded as a ‘mixed 
agreement’, initially involving the then European Economic Community (EEC), the 
then European Community on Steel and Coal (ECSC) and all then EEC Member 
States a s Contracting Parties. The reason why the EEA Agreement took the form of 
a mixed agreement, and not a ‘pure’ Community agreement concluded only by the 
EEC and the ECSC on the ‘EU side’, lies in the division of powers between the EU 
and its Member States under European primary law. According to the principle of 
conferral powers today enshrined in Article 4(1) of the TEU, the EU can solely take 
measures on matters for which it has been conferred power by the EU Treaties, while 
all other powers remain with the EU Member States. This division of powers applies 
also to the EU’s competence to conclude international agreements under Arti-
cle 216(1) of the TFEU. As the EEA Agreement also contains provisions on matters 
that lie beyond the EU’s treaty-making power22 and belong to the competences of the 
18 ECJ, Judgment of 15 July 1964, Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585 at 593 – Costa v. ENEL: ‘By contrast 
with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system’.
19 EFTA, Judgment of 28 September 2012, Case E-18/11, para. 57 – Irish Bank Resolution Corpo-
ration v. Kaupthing Bank; EFTA Court, Advisory Opinion of 10 December 1998, Case E-9/97, para. 59 
– Erla María Sveinbjörnsdóttir v. Iceland; Carl Baudenbacher, The EFTA Court: Structure and Tasks, 
in Carl Baudenbacher ed, The Handbook of EEA Law 139 (Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, 
London; Springer, 2016).
20 Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, Free Movement of Goods, in Carl Baudenbacher ed, The Handbook 
of EEA Law 418–9 (Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London; Springer, 2016); Sven Norberg, 
Karin Hökborg, Martin Johansson, Dan Eliasson and Lucien Dedichen, EEA Law: A Commentary on 
the EEA Agreement 359 (Stockholm; Kluwer 1993).
21 Vöneky and Beylage-Haarmann, op. cit. supra n 11 at para. 73; Thomas Oppermann, Claus 
Dieter Classen and Martin Nettesheim, Europarecht, § 41, para. 8 (7th ed.; Munich; Beck 2016); see 
also Hummer, op. cit. supra n 11 at paras 98–9.
22 Cf. Marc Bungenberg, Art. 217 AEUV, in Hans von der Groeben, Jürgen Schwarze and Armin 
Hatje eds, Europäisches Unionsrecht para. 26 (7th ed.; Baden-Baden; Nomos 2015).
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EU Member States, it had to be concluded as a mixed agreement.23 (Note that, in 
contrast, the EFTA did not become a Contracting Party to the EEA Agreement, 
because the EFTA is not vested with legislative competences in its own right.24 
Accordingly, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway were able to conclude the EEA 
Agreement alone.)
Since the EEA Agreement entered into force in 1994, the EEC was replaced by 
the EC (by the Maastricht Treaty),25 the ECSC expired, with its activities and 
resources being absorbed by the EC (in 2002), and the EC was subsequently replaced 
by the EU (through the Lisbon Treaty).26 Furthermore, 16 additional Member States 
joined the EU over the years,27 eventually increasing the overall number to 28. De spite 
this territorial extension of the EEA and – maybe more important – the gradual 
increase of EEC/EC/EU competences by various changes to the EEC/EC/EU Treaties,28 
the EEA Agreement’s structure as a mixed agreement remained unchanged.
Today, on the eve of Brexit, every EU Member State is individually a Contracting 
Party of the EEA Agreement, alongside the EU and the three participating EFTA 
States. Compliance with EEA law can therefore be claimed by and against each of 
them.29 The UK is also an EEA Agreement Contracting Party in its own right, and 
accordingly has its own rights and obligations thereunder. Put differently, the UK is 
not mer ely an EEA Member because of its membership in the EU, but because the 
EEA Agreement’s Preamble explicitly lists the UK as a separate Contracting Party. 
Against this background, British companies would continue to have access to the 
European common market if the UK’s withdrawal from the EU would leave its EEA 
membership undisturbed. Whether Brexit has any effect on the UK’s  membership in 
the EEA and, if yes, what kind of effect it has, cannot be answered solely on the basis 
23 Norberg, Hökborg, Johansson, Eliasson and Dedichen, op. cit. supra note 20 at 98.
24 Norberg, Hökborg, Johansson, Eliasson and Dedichen, op. cit. supra note 20 at 98; see also the 
Preamble to Protocol 35 to the EEA Agreement; Burri and Pirker, op. cit. supra note 13 at 3.
25 Pursuant to Article G(a) of the Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 
1992 (‘Maastricht Treaty’) (OJ C 191, 29 July 1992, 1), the term ‘European Economic Community’ 
was replaced by the term ‘European Community’.
26 See supra note 10. 
27 The relevant Acts of Accession required the new EU States to also become parties to the EEA 
Agreement; see Article 6(5) of the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, 
the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the 
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the 
Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded (OJ L 
236, 23 September 2003, 3); Article 6(6) of the Protocol concerning the conditions and arrangements 
for admission of the republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union (OJ L 157, 21 June 2005, 
29); Article 6(5) of the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Croatia (OJ L 
112, 24 April 2012, 21); see also Article 5(2) of the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the 
Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden 
(OJ C 241, 29 August 1994, 21).
28 The changes to the division of powers that followed from these treaty modifications were accom-
modated within EEA law through Article 2(c) of the EEA Agreement; see in more detail about this 
provision below at 4.4.3. 
29 Compare Vöneky and Beylage-Haarmann, op. cit. supra n 11 at para. 22.
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of EU law, but depends primarily on the EEA Agreement that sets out the require-
ments for establishing and terminating an EEA membership.
3. Possibilities to Terminate EEA Membership
As a starting point, it is helpful to recall that the EEA Agreement was never designed 
as a treaty that demanded an eternal membership from its Contracting Parties, as – at 
least according to some – EC Treaties did prior to the Lisbon Treaty of 2007: Relying 
on treaty clauses providing that the European Treaties had been concluded ‘for an 
unlimited period’ (today contained in Article 53 of the TEU and Article 356 of the 
TFEU)30 or on the Treaties’ federal or constitutional character,31 it was argued that 
no Member State had a right to leave the EC.32 In contrast, the EEA Agreement has 
always explicitly allowed for a unilateral withdrawal of any Contracting Party, should 
the Party so desire.33 In addition, general treaty law authorizes a termination of or 
withdrawal from the EEA Agreement by consent of all Contracting Parties.34
3.1. Unilateral Voluntary Withdrawal, Article 127(1) of the EEA Agreement
Article 127(1) of the EEA Agreement expressly sets forth the possibility for a Con-
tracting Party to voluntarily terminate its EEA membership. According to this provi-
sion, each Contracting Party may withdraw from the EEA Agreement, provided it 
gives at least 12 months’ notice in writing to the other Contracting Parties. The word-
ing of the provision makes clear that the UK would be entitled to withdraw from the 
EEA Agreement, should it so desire. However, in the on-going discussions about 
Brexit the UK has never expressed a desire to do so.35 As will be demonstrated in the 
present article, such a withdrawal would in any case not be in the UK’s best interest, 
30 Hans Peter Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 99–100 and 211 (Tübingen; Mohr Siebeck 
1972); Ulrich Everling, Sind die Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften noch Herren der 
Verträge?, in Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung – Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit – Menschenrechte: Fest-
schrift für Hermann Mosler 172 at 184 (Berlin, Heidelberg, New York; Springer 1983).
31 Jürgen Schwarze, Das allgemeine Völkerrecht in den innergemeinschaftlichen Rechtsbeziehun-
gen, Europarecht 1 at 16 (1983); John Hill, The European Economic Community: The Right of Member 
State Withdrawal 12 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law Law 335 (1982).
32 But see Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court), Judgment of the Sec-
ond Senate of 30 June 2009 –2 BvE 2/08 et al. –, 123 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 
267, para. 330.
33 See 3.1. below.
34 See 3.2. below.
35 Some authors assume that the UK will declare a withdrawal from the EEA in order to prevent 
the freedom of movement for workers under the EEA Agreement from applying; see e.g. Burkhard 
Hess, Back to the Past: BREXIT und das europäische internationale Privat- und Verfahrensrecht 36 
Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 418 (2016). On the free movement of workers 
according to Articles 28–30 of the EEA Agreement, see in more detail 5.1.2.
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as an EEA membership puts the country and its citizens in a better legal position than 
they would be in outside of the EEA.
This immediately raises the question whether the UK is under an obligation to also 
declare a withdrawal from the EEA in case it withdraws from the EU. Article 127(1) 
of the EEA Agreement sets out no such obligation, but by its wording (‘may with-
draw’) merely provides an option to withdraw, leaving the use of this option entirely 
to each Contracting Party’s discretion. It thereby stands in contrast to the neighbour-
ing provision – the EEA Agreement’s Article 128(1) – that governs applications to 
become a party to the EEA Agreement: Article 128(1) of the EEA Agreement indeed 
imposes an obligation to apply for EEA membership on all States that become EU 
members (‘shall – apply’),36 while leaving an application to the discretion of Swit-
zerland and other States becoming EFTA members (‘may – apply’). A comparison 
of the two provisions therefore makes clear that no obligation to withdraw from the 
EEA is imposed by Article 127(1) of the EEA Agreement.
The EEA Agreement’s present interpretation is furthermore supported by the fact 
that a possibility to expel a Member State against its will does not even exist under 
EU law,37 although the EU is marked by a significantly closer relationship between 
its members than the EEA.38 Under the current EU Treaties, the most severe sanction 
against a Member State is not its removal from the EU, but the rather complicated 
procedure under Article 7 of the TEU that can at most result in a suspension of certain 
rights under the Treaties, including a Member State’s voting rights in the Council 
(Article 7(3) of the TEU). And even such a suspension of rights (that has never been 
used against any EU State) may only be declared in case of a Member State’s serious 
and persistent breach of the values referred to in Article 2 of the TEU, namely respect 
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities (Article 7(2) of 
the TEU). In case of the UK, it has never been suggested that any breach of such 
fundamental values has occurred – rather, Brexit would be no more than the use of 
an option explicitly granted to each EU Member State by Article 50 of the TEU.
At the same time, the existence of Article 127(1) of the EEA Agreement does not 
necessarily mean that a voluntary withdrawal from the EEA Agreement is the only 
possible way for a State to lose its EEA membership. It therefore remains to be seen39 
36 Adam Lazowski, EU Do Not Worry, Croatia is Behind You: A Commentary on the Seventh Acces-
sion Treaty 8 Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy 1 at 33 (2012); Giulio Haas and Valentin 
Zellweger, Allgemeine und Schlussbestimmungen (Art. 118–129 EWR-A), in Olivier Jacot-Guillarmod 
ed, Accord EEE, EWR-Abkommen, EEA Agreement, 688 ( Zurich, Berne; Schulthess Polygraphischer 
Verlag and Verlag Stämpfli & Cie AG, 1992); see also supra note 10.
37 See Christian Calliess, Art. 50 EUV, in Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert eds, EUV/AEUV: 
Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäisches Union mit Grundrechtecharta. Kommentar, paras 16–17 (5th 
ed.; Munich; Beck 2016); Juliane Kokott, Art. 356 AEUV, in Rudolf Streinz ed, EUV/AEUV, para. 6 
(2nd ed.; Munich; Beck 2012).
38 See 2.1 above.
39 Under 4.
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whether other legal rules may result in Brexit having a direct or indirect effect on the 
UK’s Contracting Party status under the EEA Agreement.
3.2. Treaty Termination by Consent of All Parties, Article 54(b) of the VCLT
Alternatively, it is always possible for the EEA States to terminate the EEA Agree-
ment – entirely, or only in relation to the UK – by consent of all Contracting Parties, 
including the UK, in accordance with Article 54(b) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT)40. Article 54(b) of the VCLT sets out customary international 
law by stipulating that the termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may 
take place at any time by consent of all the parties.41 The UK’s EEA Membership 
could therefore in any case be terminated by consent of all EEA Contracting Parties 
as ‘masters of their treaty’,42 requiring an express or implicit agreement between the 
EU, all EU Member States as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
4. Effect of Brexit on the United Kingdom’s Contracting Party Status under 
the EEA Agreement
Assuming that neither an express withdrawal from the EEA Agreement will be 
declared by the UK nor all EEA Contracting Parties will terminate the Agreement by 
consent, the central question remains: Does Brexit nevertheless result in the UK los-
ing its current EEA membership? As will be demonstrated below, the answer is not 
easily given.
4.1. No Specific Provision in the EEA Agreement
The main source of uncertainty is that the EEA Agreement does not contain any spe-
cific provision addressing the effect of a EU Member State leaving the EU. As far as 
the wording of the original EEA Agreement of 1993 is concerned, this silence was 
not altogether surprising, since the EU and EC Treaties before the Lisbon Treaty of 
2007 made no mention of an EU State’s right to withdraw from these treaties, and 
the very existence of such a right was heavily disputed.43 (In spite of this, Greenland, 
which forms part of Denmark, had effectively withdrawn from the EEC in 1985,44 
40 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded on 23 May 1969, UN Treaties Series 
Vol. 1155, I-18232.
41 Mark E Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 689 
(Leiden, Boston; Martinus Nijhoff, 2009); Thomas Giegerich Article 54 in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten 
Schmalenbach eds, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, paras 8, 10, 37 (Heidelberg, Dordrecht, 
London, New York; Springer, 2012).
42 Cf. Villiger, op. cit. supra n 41 at 686; Giegerich, op. cit. supra n 41 at para. 37.
43 See above 3.
44 Ove Johansen and Carsten Lehman Sørensen, Grönlands Austritt aus der EG 38 Europa-Archiv 
399 (1983); Hans R Krämer, Greenland’s European Community (EC-)Referendum, Background and 
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albeit in an indirect manner not comparable to Brexit.) Against this background, it is 
understandable that the legal effects of an EC State withdrawing from the EC initially 
remained unaddressed in the EEA Agreement.
What is more striking is that the EEA Agreement‘s text also remained unchanged 
after Article 50 of the TEU had been introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, and a possibil-
ity of EU States withdrawing from the Union had thereby become reality. Despite 
this important change in EU primary law, no provision about the effect of a with-
drawal from the EU on the withdrawing State’s EEA membership was inserted into 
the EEA Agreement when the Agreement was modified on occasion of Croatia’s 
accession to the EU.45
In light of the EEA Agreement’s legislative history, the Agreement’s on-going 
silence about the legal effect of withdrawals from the EU could be read as reflecting 
an intentional decision by its drafters, indicating that such a withdrawal shall have no 
effect on the withdrawing State’s status under the EEA Agreement. Under this 
assumption, no further investigation would be necessary, as a post-Brexit UK would 
simply remain a Contracting Party to the EEA Agreement. However, it is submitted 
that such an interpretation hardly finds a sufficient basis in the Agreement’s drafting 
history: As far as could be ascertained, the EEA Contracting Parties never made a 
conscious decision to exclude any possible effect of a withdrawal in accordance with 
Article 50 of the TEU on the EEA. It rather appears as if the matter was overlooked 
and therefore remained unaddressed after the Lisbon Treaty had been made, leaving 
an (unintended) gap in the EEA Agreement.
In order to fill this gap, the starting point should be an interpretation of the EEA 
Agreement’s provisions and underlying principles as well as of the TEU and general 
principles of EU law,46 to which we turn next.
4.2. No Direct Effect of the United King dom’s Notification to Withdraw from the 
EU on the UK’s Contracting Party Status under the EEA Agreement
The gap just identified47 could relatively easily be filled if a notification by the UK of 
its intention to withdraw from the EU (Article 50(2) first sentence of the TEU) was 
found to have a direct effect on the UK’s status as a Contracting Party under the EEA 
Agreement. However, an investigation of the TEU and the EEA Agreement reveals 
that a notification under Article 50 of the TEU has no such ‘cross-treaty’ effect:
Consequences 25 German Yearbook of International Law 273 (1982).
45 See supra note 9.
46 The ‘considerable importance’ of general principles in filling gaps within the EU legal order has 
inter alia been stressed by Advocate General Verica Trstenjak, Opinion of 30 June 2009, Case C-101/08, 
para. 68 – Audiolux and Others as well as Opinion of 8 September 2011, Case C-282/10, para. 93 – 
Maribel Dominguez. See also Advocate General Carl Otto Lenz, Opinion of 1 December 1988, Case 
359/87, para. 31 – Pietro Pinna: ‘Even a gap in the rules which had arisen inadvertently would have 
had to be filled in a manner consistent with the system by means of judicial development of the law.’
47 See 4.1 above.
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First, Article 50 of the TEU fails to indicate that a withdrawal from the EU would 
have any consequence for the withdrawing State’s membership in the EEA. On the 
contrary, the topic of both notifi cations is a different one: While a notifi cation in 
accordance with Article 50(2) of the TEU concerns the withdrawal from the EU (see 
Article 50(1) of the TEU), a notice under Article 127(1) of the EEA Agreement48 
concerns a withdrawal from said Agreement. This stands in accordance with the fact 
that the TEU and the EEA Agreement, although closely related, still remain separate 
treaties. It is furthermore supported by examples in EEA-related treaty practice in 
which the parties explicitly provided for a ‘cross-treaty effect’ of withdrawals, as e.g. 
in the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance 
Authority and a Court of Justice (SCA)49: According to Article 50(1) of the SCA, any 
EFTA State withdrawing from the EEA Agreement shall ipso facto cease to be a party 
to the SCA on the same day as the withdrawal takes effect. In contrast, a similar clause 
is neither contained in the TEU nor the EEA Agreement.
Interpreting a notification under Article 50(2) of the TEU as also resulting in a with-
drawal from the EEA is furthermore excluded by the fact that the three EFTA States 
within the EEA – Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway – are not parties to the TEU. 
From the perspective of these three EEA States, Article 50 of the TEU therefore con-
stitutes mere ‘internal law’ in the sense of Article 27 of the VCLT,50 adopted by and 
binding on the Contracting Parties of the EEA Agreement’s ‘EU pillar’ only. Accord-
ing to Article 27 of the VCLT which codifies a rule of customary law,51 ‘[a] party 
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to per-
form a treaty’. To the same end, Article 34 of the VCLT52 makes clear that ‘[a] treaty 
does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent’ (pacta 
tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt), thereby also preventing Iceland’s, Liechtenstein’s and 
Norway’s right to trade with the UK under the conditions laid down in the EEA 
Agreement from being curtailed by Article 50 of the TEU.
Second, a notification of intention to withdraw from the EU cannot be interpreted 
as a withdrawal under Article 127(1) of the EEA Agreement because both declara-
tions also differ in terms of their addressee and of their legal consequences. As regards 
the addressee, a notification of withdrawal from the EU has to be made to the Euro-
48 See already 3.1 above.
49 Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a 
Court of Justice, OJ L 344, 31 January 1994, 3 (Surveillance and Court Agreement, ‘SCA’). 
50 See Kirsten Schmalenbach, Art. 27, in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach eds, Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, para. 10 (Berlin, Heidelberg; Springer 2012).
51 ICJ Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France) (Judgment) 
[2008] ICJ Reports 174, para. 124; Kirsten Schmalenbach, op. cit. supra n 50 at para 4.
52 It is generally recognised that Article 34 of the VCLT codifies customary law; see ECJ, Judg-
ment of 25 February 2010, Case C-386/08 [2010] ECR I-1289, paras 42, 44 – Brita; Alexander Proelss, 
Art. 34, in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach eds, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
A Commentary, para. 4 (Berlin, Heidelberg; Springer 2012); Villiger, op. cit. supra n 41 at 472; see 
also ECJ, Judgment of 23 January 2014, Case C-537/11, para. 44 – Manzi and Compagnia Naviera 
Orchestra.
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pean Council, Article 50(2) first sentence of the TEU. In contrast, a notification of 
withdrawal from the EEA must be made ‘to the other Contracting Parties’ (Article 
127(1) of the EEA Agreement), i.e. all other 31 Contracting Parties to the EEA Agree-
ment. As far as the EU in its role as one of these Contracting Parties is concerned, the 
notification would have to be directed at the Commission that ensures the EU’s exter-
nal representation (Article 17(1) sixth sentence of the TEU), and not at the European 
Council. Accordingly, a notification of withdrawal made in accordance with Arti-
cle 50(2) of the TEU would be made to an addressee different from the addressees 
mentioned in Article 127(1) of the EEA Agreement – as a matter of fact, not a single 
one of the 31 addressees to be notified under the latter provision would properly be 
reached by a withdrawal notification under Article 50(2) of the TEU. Already for this 
reason, a withdrawal from the EU cannot be regarded as a withdrawal from the EEA.
Furthermore, an interpretation of a notification under Article 50(2) of the TEU as 
(also) being a notice under Article 127(1) of the EEA Agreement is excluded by dif-
ferences in the legal effect that both notices are aimed at: A notification in accordance 
with Article 127(1) of the EEA Agreement automatically leads to a termination of 
the declaring State’s EEA membership once a ‘grace period’ of 12 months has passed. 
In contrast, a notification under Article 50(2) of the TEU does not automatically result 
in a withdrawal from the EU, but first triggers a pactum de negotiando53 requiring the 
EU54 to negotiate and conclude a withdrawal agreement with the withdrawing State, 
Article 50(2) second sentence of the TEU. Only if no such withdrawal agreement has 
been concluded within two years after the notification, the TEU and TFEU cease to 
apply to the withdrawing State, unless the European Council, in agreement with the 
withdrawing State, has unanimously decided to extend this period (Article 50(3) of 
the TEU). While the legal effect of a notification under Article 127(1) of the EEA 
Agreement is therefore merely deferred for 12 months, the effect of its counterpart 
under Article 50(2) of the TEU is both deferred for two years and conditional in 
nature, the event fulfilling the condition precedent being the unsuccessful outcome 
of the negotiations between the EU and the withdrawing EU State. These differences 
in legal effect make it impossible to equate one notice with the other, in particular 
because the notice under Article 50(2) of the TEU was designed to have (yet) no effect 
whatsoever at the moment the 12 months period of Article 127(1) of the EEA Agree-
ment expires.
In summary, a future notification of the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU 
would have no direct effect on its EEA membership, but would leave its status as a 
Contracting Party to the EEA Agreement untouched.
53 Oliver Dörr, Art. 50 EUV: Austritt aus der Union, in Eberhard Grabritz, Meinhard Hilf and Mar-
tin Nettesheim eds, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, para. 15 (58th suppl.; Munich; Beck 2016). 
54 Jürgen Basedow, Brexit und das Privat- und Wirtschaftsrecht 24 Zeitschrift für Europäisches 
Privatrecht 567, at 568 (2016) points out that Article 50(2) of the TEU leaves uncertain which of the 
EU’s organs will conduct the negotiations.
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4.3. Requirements of Article 128 of the EEA Agreement Not Applicable
It furthermore has been suggested that a post-Brexit UK could only be part of the 
EEA by applying to become a party to the EEA Agreement in accordance with its 
Article 128.55 If this suggestion was correct, the hurdles for the UK trying to secure 
a p osition within the EEA would indeed be significant: For once, Article 128(1) of 
the EEA Agreement only envisages applications to become a Contracting Party from 
States that are a member of either the EU or of EFTA. As the UK would no longer 
be a EU State, this requirement could mean that it would first have to become an 
EFTA State. (Whether Article 128(1) of the EEA Agreement irreversibly excludes 
States that do neither belong to the EC nor EFTA from joining the EEA seems 
doubtful,56 as the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement could nevertheless decide 
to admit such a State by way of an agreement ratified by all Contracting Parties.) 
Assuming arguendo that an EFTA membership of the UK was required, its accession 
to the EFTA would depend on a unanimous approval by all four current EFTA States 
in the EFTA Council (Articles 43(2), (5) and 56(1) of the EFTA Convention)57, effec-
tively resulting in a veto right for each of the EFTA States. (Norwegian government 
officials have in the past indicated their willingness to veto an accession by the UK.) 
In a second step, Article 128(2) of the EEA Agreement would require an agreement 
between all EEA Contracting Parties, resulting in another veto opportunity for the 
EU and each of the EEA States.
However, it is submitted that Article 128 of the EEA Agreement is in fact inap-
plicable to the UK’s situation after Brexit. The reason is simple: By regulating appli-
cations by States ‘to become a party to’ the EEA Agreement, Article 128 only governs 
situations involving applicant States that are not already a Contracting Party to the 
EEA Agreement. The purpose of the conditions laid down in the provision is to allow 
the incumbent Contracting Parties to exercise control over States joining the EEA at 
a later time, given that additional Contracting Parties will expand the existing Con-
tracting Parties’ obligations under the Agreement. In case of the post-Brexit UK, this 
purpose is not at stake, as all present EEA Contracting Parties approved the UK’s 
participation when the UK became one of the initial EEA Member States in 1994. 
Given that its withdrawal from the EU cannot be equated with its withdrawal from 
the EEA,58 Brexit would not expand the scope of the EEA Agreement to a new State 
as in situations envisaged by Article 128, but would merely result in a partial shift of 
rights and obligations under the Agreement from one present Contracting Party (the 
55 House of Commons Library, Research Paper 13/42, 19; Basedow, op. cit. supra note 54 at 569; 
Seeger, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1817; Weller, Thomale and Benz, op. cit. supra note 3 at 2380; Wolff, 
op. cit. supra note 3 at 1784; Bode, Bron, Fleckstein-Weiland, Mick and Reich, op. cit. supra note 3 at 
1367; Garvey, Birch and Maeve Hanna, op. cit. supra note 3 at 3.
56 Compare also Basedow, op. cit. supra note 54 at 569, who suggests that Article 128(1) of the 
EEA Agreement would also allow applications by former EFTA States.
57 Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association of 4 January 1960, as subsequently 
amended.
58 See 4.2 above.
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EU) to another present Contracting Party (the UK). Such an internal shift in compe-
tence is a matter governed by Article 2(c) of the EEA Agreement,59 and not its Arti-
cle 128.
In summary, Article 128 of the EEA Agreement does not apply to the post-Brexit 
UK’s situation.
4.4. Indirect Effect of the United Kingdom’s Withdrawal from the EU on the UK’s 
Contracting Party Status under the EEA Agreement?
The points discussed above still leave room for the question whether the UK’s with-
drawal from the EU may have an indirect effect on the UK’s Contracting Party status 
under the EEA Agreement, in particular because certain provisions of the EEA Agree-
ment at first sight do not seem to allow for a Contracting Party that is neither a mem-
ber of the EU nor of EFTA. This question will be addressed next.
4.4.1. ‘Two Pillar’ Structure vs. Wording of the EEA Agreement
Uncertainties surrounding the EEA Agreement’s application to a post-Brexit UK are 
predominantly raised by the Agreement’s wording. Many, if not all of its provisions 
were understandably drafted with the pre-Brexit situation in mind, a situation marked 
by all EEA Contracting Parties belonging either to the EU (respectively its predeces-
sors) or the EFTA. Accordingly, provisions of the EEA Agreement sometimes speak 
only of the rights or obligations of ‘EFTA States’60 (a term further defined in Article 
2(b) of the Agreement), and/or of ‘EC Member States’61 respectively ‘the Community’.62 
In doing so, they use categories that do not or no longer seem to encompass the post-
Brexit UK. (Similar problems do not arise under the more common provisions in the 
EEA Agreement that generically refer to the ‘Contracting Parties’.)63
It is submitted that the appropriate solution lies in an interpretation of the EEA 
Agreement’s terms in the light of its object and purpose, as envisaged by Article 31(1) 
of the VCLT. This provision is recognised as a codification of customary law64 and 
has frequently been applied by the ECJ in the interpretation of EC/EU association 
59 See 4.4.3 below.
60 Articles 56(1)(a) and (b), 57(2)(b), 62(1)(b), 80, 81, 82(1), 83, 90(1) and (2), 99(1) and (2), 100, 
101, 102(3), 108 and 116 of the EEA Agreement.
61 Articles 16(1), 28, 31(1), 34, 36(1), 40, 42(2), 43, 48(1), 50(2), 51(2), 59(1), 61(1) and (2)(b), 
62(1)(a) and 124 of the EEA Agreement.
62 Articles 44, 90(2), 94(1) and 96(1) of the EEA Agreement.
63 Articles 1(1), 3, 5, 7, 8–16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 34, 36, 40, 41, 43, 45, 46, 48(2), 
50(1), 51(1), 52 and 93(1) of the EEA Agreement.
64 ICJ Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Reports 11, 
para. 65; ICJ Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) (Judgment) 
[2009] ICJ Reports 210, para. 47; ICJ LaGrand (Germany/USA) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Reports 463, 
para. 99; ICJ Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) (Judgment) [1999] ICJ Reports 1042, para. 18; 
Oliver Dörr, Article 31, in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach eds, Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties: A Commentary, para. 6 (Berlin, Heidelberg; Springer 2012).
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agreements with third States.65 In the EEA legal order, the teleological approach to 
interpretation enshrined in Article 31(1) of the VCLT has even been described as the 
‘key interpretation method’.66
In applying this interpretative approach to the post-Brexit EEA Agreement, the 
appropriate starting point is the definition of the Agreement’s object and purpose 
found in its Preamble and its Article 1(1). In this respect, the fourth recital of the 
Preamble speaks of ‘the objective of establishing a dynamic and homogeneous Euro-
pean Economic Area, based on common rules and equal conditions of competition 
and providing for the adequate means of enforcement including at the judicial level, 
and achieved on the basis of equality and reciprocity and of an overall balance of 
benefits, rights and obligations for the Contracting Parties’, while Article 1(1) of the 
EEA Agreement provides that ‘[t]he aim of this Agreement of association is to pro-
mote a continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations 
between the Contracting Parties with equal conditions of competition, and the respect 
of the same rules, with a view to creating a homogeneous European Economic Area’.67 
Through their focus on the ‘homogeneous European Economic Area’ as well as their 
generically framed references to ‘the Contracting Parties’, both provisions make clear 
that the EEA Agreement above all aims at establishing one single market based on 
equality of all Contracting Parties. To the same end, Article 4 of the EEA Agreement 
– a provision recognised as a cornerstone of EEA Law68 – prohibits any discrimina-
tion on grounds of nationality ‘within the scope of application of this Agreement’, 
similarly without distinguishing between different types of EEA Contracting Parties.
With this object and purpose of the EEA Agreement in mind, its provisions refer-
ring to ‘EC Member States’ and/or ‘EFTA States’ do so for one of two reasons. In 
some cases, this wording is used as a mere alternative expression for ‘the Contracting 
Parties’, with the respective provisions clearly intended to address all EEA States 
indiscriminately.69 Provisions of this type should therefore be interpreted as covering 
65 ECJ, Opinion 1/91 of 14 December 1991 [1991] ECR I-6079, para. 14 – EEA Agreement; ECJ, 
Judgment of 1 July 1993, Case C-312/91 [1993] ECR I-3751, para. 12 – Metalsa; ECJ, Judgment of 2 
March 1999, Case C-416/96 [1999] ECR I-1209, para. 47 – El-Yassini; ECJ, Judgment of 20 November 
2001, Case C-268/99 [2001] ECR I-8615, para. 35 – Jany and Others; ECJ, Judgment of 25 February 
2010, Case C-386/08, para. 42 – Brita; see also Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation 137–40 (2nd 
ed.; Oxford; Oxford University Press 2015).
66 Thomas Nordby and Kristoffer Nerland, Norwegian Bar, in Carl Baudenbacher ed, The Hand-
book of EEA Law, 313 (Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London; Springer, 2016).
67 Emphases added.
68 Cf. EFTA Court, Judgment of 28 January 2013, Case E-16/11, para. 207 – EFTA Surveillance 
Authority v. Iceland (‘general principle’); EFTA Court, Judgment of 25 April 2012, Case E-13/11, 
para. 36 – Granville Establishment v. Volker Anhalt, Melanie Anhalt and Jasmin Barbaro, née Anhalt; 
Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen, General Prohibition of Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality, in 
Carl Baudenbacher ed, The Handbook of EEA Law, 392 (Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, 
London; Springer, 2016); Olivier Jacot-Guillarmond, Préambule, objectifs et principles (art. 1er-7 EEE), 
in Olivier Jacot-Guillarmod ed, Accord EEE, EWR-Abkommen, EEA Agreement, 61 (Zurich, Berne; 
Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag and Verlag Stämpfli & Cie AG, 1992).
69 Articles 16(1), 28, 31(1), 34, 36(1), 40, 42(2), 43, 44, 48(1), 50(2), 51(2), 59(1), 61(1) and (2)
(b) and 124 of the EEA Agreement.
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all EEA States independent of their EC/EU or EFTA membership, thereby also cov-
ering a post-Brexit UK.
Other provisions70 distinguish between ‘EC Member States’/’the Community’ and 
‘EFTA States’ because of the EEA Agreement’s ‘two-pillar structure’.71 This struc-
ture is mainly due to the making of EEA law being divided into two separate phases: 
In the first phase, EU law with EEA relevance is created by the EU organs, before in 
the second phase it is incorporated into the EEA.72 Insofar, there is indeed a differ-
ence between EEA Contracting Parties involved in the first phase, and those that are 
not – a distinction that the respective provisions of the EEA Agreement express by 
using the categories ‘EC Member States’/‘EFTA States’, because these terms ade-
quately categorised the EEA States at the time the Agreement was drafted. However, 
once Brexit has occurred, these provisions will need to be able to also capture the 
post-Brexit UK. Again, this is made possible by their teleological interpretation: As 
provisions of this type try to distinguish between, on the one hand, EEA Contracting 
Parties currently making or directly affected by EU legislation and, on the other hand, 
Contracting Parties currently only obliged to follow EU legislation once it has been 
incorporated into EEA Agreement’s Annexes, they really aim at distinguishing 
between the current ‚EU pillar‘ of the EEA and its current ‚non-EU pillar‘. Accord-
ingly, they should be so interpreted in light of their apparent purpose and in spite of 
their wording.
As a consequence, the EEA’s ‚non-EU pillar‘ is to be understood as also including 
the post-Brexit UK, although the term ‘EFTA States’ at first sight may seem to sug-
gest otherwise.
4.4.2. Article 126 of the EEA Agreement Does Not Hinder the Agreement’s 
Application to a Post-Brexit United Kingdom
The approach to the EEA Agreement’s post-Brexit interpretation developed above73 
also elucidates that Article 126(1) of the Agreement does not hinder its application 
to a post-Brexit UK, in spite of the provision’s wording. Article 126(1) defines the 
territorial scope of the EEA Agreement74 by stipulating that ‘[t]he Agreement shall 
apply to the territories to which the Treaty establishing the European Economic Com-
munity is applied and under the conditions laid down in that Treaty, and to the ter-
ritories of Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway.’ At 
first sight, Article 126(1) could therefore be misunderstood as preventing the Agree-
ment from applying to the UK, given that the TEEC (and its successor, the TFEU) 
70 Articles 56(1)(a), (b) and (c), 57(2)(b), 62(1)(a) and (b), 80, 81, 82(1), 83, 90(1) and (2), 93(2), 
94(1), 95(1) and (3), 96(1), 99(1) and (2), 100, 101, 102(3), 108 and 116 of the EEA Agreement.
71 This term has frequently been used in legal commentary; see e.g. Georges Baur, Decision-Making 
Procedure and Implementation of New Law in Carl Baudenbacher ed, The Handbook of EEA Law, 45 at 
47 (Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London; Springer, 2016); Norberg, Hökborg, Johansson, 
Eliasson and Dedichen, op. cit. supra note 20 at 305.
72 See in more detail Baur, op. cit. supra n 71 at 47–51.
73 See 4.4.1 above.
74 Norberg, Hökborg, Johansson, Eliasson and Dedichen, op. cit. supra note 20 at 303.
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will no longer be applied to the UK’s territory once Brexit takes effect, and that the 
UK is not individually mentioned in the provision.
It is submitted that such an interpretation would misconstrue Article 126(1) of the 
Agreement. As a (mere) ‘territo rial clause’,75 the provision does not in itself grant 
Contracting Party status, but merely specifies a single aspect of such a st atus that has 
been granted elsewhere, namely a treaty’s terrorial scope of application in cases in 
which the treaty does not apply to one or more Contracting Parties’ entire territory. 
As far as Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway a re concerned, Article 126(1) is therefore 
arguably superfluous, as it merely repeats the customary law rule that a treaty is gen-
erally binding in respect of a party’s entire territory (Article 29 of the VCLT).76 In 
regard of the post-Brexit UK, two further reasons speak against Article 126(1) of the 
EEA Agreement affecting its continuing Contracting Party status: First, the legal 
definition of the term ‘Contracting Parties’ in the Preamble77 to the Agreement con-
tinues to list the UK. And second, the TEEC did apply to the UK’s territory when the 
EEA Agreement was concluded. Denying the UK’s Contracting Party status solely 
because of changes made within EU primary law at a later time would therefore affect 
Iceland’s, Liechtenstein’s and Norway’s rights under the EEA Agreement in violation 
of Articles 27 and 34 of the VCLT.78
A more difficult question is whether Article 126 of the EEA Agreement will still 
influence the territorial scope of the EEA law’s applicability within the UK after 
Brexit has occurred. It will be addressed separately below.79
4.4.3. EEA Agreement Tolerates Reallocations of Competences between EU and 
its Member States
Another provision of the EEA Agreement that – at least at first sight – could prevent 
the UK from remaining part of the EEA after Brexit is Article 2(c). This provision 
sets out a specific definition of the term ‘Contracting Parties’ as regards the EU and 
its Member States, i.e. the ‘EU pillar’ of the EEA. According to it, the term ‘Contract-
ing Parties’ means, concerning the Community and the EC Member States,80 the 
Community and the EC Member States, or the Community, or the EC Member States. 
Whenever the EEA Agreement speaks of a ‘Contracting Party’, the term accordingly 
can either include the EU and its Member States cumulatively or, alternatively, only 
the EU or only its individual Member States. Which of these three meanings applies 
in each case must, according to the second sentence of Article 2(c), be deduced from 
75 See Karl Doehring, The Scope of the Territorial Application of Treaties 27 Zeitschrift für aus-
ländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 483 (1967).
76 The situation is more complicated with respect to some of the EU States within the EEA. See 
therefore in more detail on Article 126(1) of the EEA Agreement and Article 29 of the VCLT 5.1.3 
below.
77 See 2.2 above.
78 See already 4.2 above with more detailed reasoning.
79 See at 5.1.3.
80 On the use of term ‘EC Member States’ (instead of ‘EU Member States’), see 4.4.4.1 below.
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the relevant provisions of the EEA Agreement as well as from the respective compe-
tence of the EU and the EU States under the TFEU81 (formerly: the EC Treaty).
The raison d’être for Article 2(c) of the EEA Agreement is the same reason also 
underlying the Agreement’s nature as a ‘mixed agreement’,82 namely the division of 
powers between the EU and its Member States.83 The flexible approach adopted in 
the provision, requiring a case-by-case assessment in light of (also) the periodically 
reformed EU primary law, was chosen by the EEA Contracting Parties because the 
division of powers was considered both as unclear in some areas and as being under 
constant development over time.84 In agreeing to Article 2(c), the non-EU Contracting 
Parties to the EEA indicated it to be unimportant for them which Contracting Party 
on the Agreement’s ‘EU side’ makes certain that EEA law is being observed, as long 
as one Contracting Party – the one competent under the current division of powers in 
the EU – does.
In essence, Article 2(c) of the EEA Agreement thereby confirms that the UK 
remains a Contracting Party in case of Brexit: As Brexit will result in all competences 
that the UK had conferred upon the EU through the TEU/TFEU reverting back to the 
UK in their entirety, its consequences can easily be seen as governed by Article 2(c). 
When applied to the UK in the post-Brexit era, ‘Contracting Party’ would then mean 
the UK only, because TEU and TFEU no longer give any competence to the EU in 
matters concerning the UK. Since there is no indication that this case is not covered 
by Article 2(c) of the EEA Agreement, the Agreement’s tolerant position towards 
reallocations of competences expressed therein supports a post-Brexit EEA Member-
ship of the UK.
4.4.4. EEA Agreement Tolerates Changes to Contracting Parties’ Public 
International Law Characteristics
Furthermore, the EEA Agreement tolerates changes to Contracting Parties’ charac-
teristics under public international law, as notably to a State’s membership in supra-
national or international organisations like the EC or EFTA. This is already apparent 
from the last recital of the Agreement’s preamble, which stipulates that the EEA 
Agreement ‘does not restrict the decision-making autonomy or the treaty-making 
power of the Contracting Parties, subject to the provisions of this Agreement and the 
limitations set by public international law’.
In the past, a number of EEA Contracting Parties have indeed exercised their 
decision-making autonomy and treaty-making power in order to change certain of 
their public international law characteristics. In practice under the EEA Agreement, 
these changes were always taken into account in the application of EEA law, although 
– and this is important – the Agreement’s wording had not or not yet been modified 
and therefore failed to reflect the changes that had taken place outside of the EEA’s 
81 See already supra note 10 and in more detail below at 4.4.4.1.
82 See 2.2 above.
83 Norberg, Hökborg, Johansson, Eliasson and Dedichen, op. cit. supra note 20 at 98.
84 Norberg, Hökborg, Johansson, Eliasson and Dedichen, op. cit. supra note 20 at 98.
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regime. In short, the EEA Agreement in its practical application tolerated those 
changes, in spite of its unchanged wording. As Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT provides 
that ‘any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’ shall be taken into account when 
interpreting a treaty, examples of such past practice are relevant in assessing Brexit’s 
effect on the UK’s EEA status.
4.4.4.1. EC or EU as EEA Contracting Party?
One example immediately becomes apparent when reading the EEA Agreement’s 
text as currently in force: The Agreement’s Preamble lists as a Contracting Party ‘[t]
he European Community’, but makes no mention whatsoever of the European Union. 
This is striking because ever since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, 
Article 1(3) of the TEU has provided that ‘[t]he Union shall replace and succeed the 
European Community.’85 Despite the fact that the EC had thereby lost its legal 
personality,86 the EEA Agreement remained unchanged until this very day and con-
tinues to speak of the EC as one of its Contracting Parties, as well as of ‘EC Member 
States’. Even the Agreement on the Participation of the Republic of Croatia in the 
European Economic Area,87 concluded in 2014 and therefore offering an easy oppor-
tunity to amend the EEA Agreement’s wording accordingly, failed to make a change. 
This proves that Article 1(3) of the TEU – a provision agreed upon only among the 
EU States and therefore not creating neither obligations nor rights for Iceland, Liech-
tenstein or Norway88 – was considered sufficient to apply the EEA Agreement to the 
EU and accept the EU’s status as Contracting Party to the Agreement. In treaty prac-
tice, the EU’s succession into the EC’s legal position had thereby been implemented 
without a prior modification of the EEA Agreement’s wording being viewed as indis-
pensable.
4.4.4.2. EFTA States Joining the EC
Further examples of past practice under the EEA Agreement concern changes in 
Contracting Parties’ EU membership, and the effect that such changes had on the 
application of the EEA Agreement.
The first of these changes occurred soon after the EEA Agreement had entered into 
force on 1 January 1994, when Austria, Finland and Sweden – all of them Contract-
ing Parties that had been EFTA States when ratifying the Agreement – joined the EC 
on 1 January 1995. In spite of the suggestion by commentators that EFTA States 
changing from one EEA pillar to the other would simultaneously have to withdraw 
from the EEA Agreement in their capacity as EFTA States, and accede to the Agree-
85 See supra note 10.
86 Cf. Martin Nettesheim, Art. 1 EUV in Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf and Martin Nettesheim 
eds, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, para. 49–52 (48th suppl.; Munich; Beck 2012); Jean-Paul 
Jacqué, Art. 1 EUV in Hans von der Groeben, Jürgen Schwarze and Armin Hatje eds, Europäisches 
Unionsrecht, para. 18 (7th ed.; Baden-Baden; Nomos 2015).
87 See supra note 9.
88 See already supra notes 50–52.
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ment in their new capacity as EC States,89 Austria, Finland and Sweden withdrew 
from EFTA, but remained parties to the EEA Agreement, although now as members 
of its EU pillar.90
The EEA Agreem ent’s wording did not reflect this change for another nine years: 
It was only adjusted in 2004 when the words ‘the Republic of Austria’, ‘the Republic 
of Finland’ and ‘the Republic of Sweden’ were relocated within the Preamble from 
their initial position after the ‘and’ (i.e. among the EFTA States) to their current place 
before the ‘and’ (i.e. among the EC States), and when the same words were struck 
from Article 126(1) of the EEA Agreement. As Austria, Finland and Sweden had 
already been EC Members since 1995, the EEA Agreement’s wording accordingly 
was incorrect until 2004, because it listed them as EFTA States during this time. In 
the Agreement’s practical application, they were nevertheless treated as EC States 
from 1995 onwards, with the term ‘EC Member States’ being read as referring to all 
current EC Member States.
4.4.4.3. New Member States Acceding to the EC/EU
Later accessions of Member States to the EC respectively the EU – namely by the 
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slova-
kia and Slovenia in 2004, by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and by Croatia in 2013 
– were handled in a two-pronged fashion: On one hand, each new EU State became 
a party to the EEA Agreement in its own right, as foreseen in (and indeed demanded 
by) Article 128(1) of the Agreement. This participation required an agreement mod-
ifying the EEA Agreement that had to be ratified or approved by all Contracting Par-
ties, Article 128(2) second sentence of the EEA Agreement, and that only entered 
into force afterwards.
On the other hand, the EC/EU in its role as a separate Contracting Party expanded 
by the territories of the newly acceded EC/EU States the moment their accession 
became effective. By virtue of Article 126(1), this expansion of the EU’s territory 
immediately resulted in an expansion of the EEA’s territorial scope, without this 
change being reflected in the EEA Agreement’s wording. Again, practice under the 
Agreement had therefore accommodated changes to a Contracting Party that had taken 
place outside of the EEA framework, and the Agreement’s unchanged wording had 
been interpreted accordingly.
4.4.4.4. Conclusions Regarding Brexit
The aforementioned examples demonstrate that changes to a Contracting Party’s 
public international law characteristics have always been accepted as both admissible 
and binding in the EEA Agreement’s application, without a modification of the Agree-
ment’s wording being necessary. It is submitted that the same must apply to a change 
89 In this sense Norberg, Hökborg, Johansson, Eliasson and Dedichen, op. cit. supra note 20 at 305.
90 Sven Norberg and Martin Johansson, The History of the EEA Agreement and the First Twenty 
Years of Its Existence in Carl Baudenbacher ed, The Handbook of EEA Law, 33 (Cham, Heidelberg, 
New York, Dordrecht, London; Springer, 2016).
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in the UK’s EU membership, which does not result in the UK losing its status as a 
Contracting Party of the EEA Agreement. This is so irrespective of the fact that the 
EEA Agreement’s wording does not explicitly recognize a category of Contracting 
Parties that neither form part of the EU nor of EFTA,91 that Article 126(1) defines the 
Agreement’s territorial scope only with reference to the territories of the EC and of 
the EFTA States92 and that Article 128(1) exclusively lists EC and EFTA States as 
eligible to apply for EEA membership: In accordance with Article 31(3)(b) of the 
VCLT, prior actions insofar speak louder than words.
4.5. No Right of Other EEA Contracting Parties to Suspend Operation or 
Terminate the EEA Agreement in Relation to the United Kingdom
A last question concerns the possible reaction by other EEA Contracting Parties to 
the UK’s continuing EEA membership in spite of a withdrawal from the EU: Would 
they have the right to suspend the EEA Agreement’s operation or even terminate the 
Agreement in relation to the UK? Such a right, if it exists, could only follow from 
customary international law as codified in Articles 54–64 of the VCLT. In the context 
of Brexit, two possible grounds potentially giving rise to such rights could be con-
sidered: A breach of the EEA Agreement by the UK, or a fundamental change of 
circumstances.
Article 60(2)(a) of the VCLT entitles the parties of a treaty to suspend the treaty’s 
operation in whole or in part or to terminate it in case of a material breach by another 
party. However, as already said earlier in a different context,93 it appears impossible 
to qualify a withdrawal from the EU as a breach of the EEA Agreement, not even an 
immaterial one. Article 50(1) of the TEU rather gives the UK an explicit right to 
withdraw from the EU, which it is free to exercise ‘in accordance with its own con-
stitutional requirements’. Given that no obligation for a Member State to remain in 
the EU is imposed, a withdrawal from the EU cannot be sanctioned ‘by the backdoor’ 
as a material breach of the EEA Agreement.
The doctrine of clausula rebus sic stantibus enshrined in Article 62 of the VCLT 
is a codification of customary international law.94 It entitles parties to terminate or 
withdraw from a treaty (Article 62(1) of the VCLT) or to suspend its operation 
(Article 62(3) of the VCLT) in case of a fundamental change of circumstances. Inso-
far, Article 62(1) of the VCLT, contains strict requirements that furthermore have to 
91 See already 4.4.1 above.
92 See 4.4.2 above.
93 See 3.1 above.
94 Cf. ICJ Fisheries Jurisdiction (Germany v. Iceland) (Judgment) [1973] ICJ Reports 3, para. 36; 
ICJ Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Reports 3, paras 46 
and 99 (Articles 60–62 of the VCLT are declaratory ‘in many respects’); ECJ, Judgement of 16 June 
1998, Case C-162/96 [1998] ECR I-3688, para. 24 – Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz; Advocate General 
Poiares Maduro, Opinion of 10 July 2008, Cases C-205/06 and C-249/06 [2009] ECR 1301, para. 61 – 
Commission v. Austria and Commission v. Sweden; Villiger, op. cit. supra n 41 at 780.
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be interpreted narrowly.95 As a result, the practical importance of clausula rebus sic 
stantibus is rather low,96 although States often view it as a last resort in their desire 
to terminate or suspend a treaty. The decisive, but open threshold of ‘fundamentality’ 
has to be determined having regard to the specific circumstances of each case. It is 
substantiated, inter alia, by Article 62(1)(b) of the V CLT setting forth that the effect 
of the change must be radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be per-
formed under the treaty.97 According to the ICJ in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, 
the ‘change must have increased the burden of the obligations to be executed to the 
extent of rendering the performance something essentially different from that origi-
nally undertaken.’98 Beyond Article 62(1)(b) of the VCLT, the ICJ requires the change 
of circumstances to ‘imperil the existence or vital development of one of the parties’99 
in order to qualify as fundamental.
When measured against this strict standard, Brexit does not constitute a fundamen-
tal change, because the EEA Agreement’s core elements can still be performed. In 
particular, its fundamental freedoms remain applicable to all Contracting Parties, 
including the UK, after Brexit.100 Although the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will 
create certain difficulties because the country’s representation in organs like the EFTA 
Court or the EFTA Surveillance Authority requires clarification,101 these changes are 
of insufficient importance because they neither radically modify the obligations still 
to be performed under the EEA Agreement nor imperil the existence or vital develop-
ment of other EEA Contracting Parties. If the Contracting Parties were to find that 
these (non-fundamental) changes call for an adaption of the Agreement, a formal 
treaty amendment would be necessary, but an adaption without the consent of all 
Contracting Parties would not be possible.102
Finally, the general principle expressed in Article 55 of the VCLT103 also militates 
against a fundamental change in case of Brexit. According to this provision, a multi-
95 ICJ Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Reports 3, 
para. 104; ILC Report 1966, 2 Yearbook of International Law Commission 259, para. 9 (1966); Advo-
cate General Poiares Maduro, Opinion of 10 July 2008, Cases C-205/06 and C-249/06 [2009] ECR 
I-1301, para. 61 – Commission v. Austria and Commission v. Sweden; Villiger, op. cit. supra n 41 at 
770; Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Treaties, Fundamental Change of Circumstances in Rüdiger Wol-
frum ed, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 35 (Oxford; Oxford University 
Press 2006).
96 Thomas Giegerich, Art. 62 in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach eds, Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, para. 7 (Berlin, Heidelberg; Springer 2012).
97 Cf. Observation by the Portuguese Government to the ILC, Waldock Report V 2 Yearbook of 
International Law Commission 40 (1966); Villiger, op. cit. supra n 41 at 774.
98 ICJ Fisheries Jurisdiction (Germany v. Iceland) (Judgment) [1973] ICJ Reports 3, para. 40.
99 ICJ Fisheries Jurisdiction (Germany v. Iceland) (Judgment) [1973] ICJ Reports 3, para. 38; but 
see Villiger, op. cit. supra n 41 at 771.
100 See on the free movement of workers (Article 28 of the EEA Agreement) 5.1.2 below and on 
the freedom of establishment (Article 31 of the Agreement) 5.1.1.1 below.
101 See 5.2 below.
102 Cf. Giegerich, op. cit. supra n 96 at para. 6.
103 The provision reflects customary international law (Villiger, op. cit. supra n 41 at 694; see also 
Giegerich, op. cit. supra n 96 at para. 14).
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lateral treaty does not terminate only because the number of its parties falls below the 
number necessary for its entry into force. The provision is in line with the general 
interest in the stability of treaties that is, in particular, manifested in the customary 
rule of pacta sunt servanda.104 If changes in the number of parties to a treaty do not 
justify its termination, a single party’s withdrawal from another treaty can, a fortiori 
and for the sake of treaty’s stability, not be invoked as a ground for terminating or 
withdrawing from the EEA Agreement.
5. Post-Brexit Situation under the EEA Agreement
The following section of this article will analyse the legal situation under EEA law 
after Brexit. For this analysis, it will be assumed that the UK has notified the European 
Council of its intention to withdraw from the EU in accordance with Article 50(2) 
first sentence of the TEU. In addition, it will be assumed that either the two-year 
period of Article 50(3) of the TEU (the so-called ‘sunset clause’)105 has lapsed with-
out having been unanimously extended, or that an agreement governing the arrange-
ments for the withdrawal (Article 50(2) second sentence of the TEU) has been 
concluded that does not address the future of the UK’s EEA membership.
5.1. Continuing Contracting Party Status of the United Kingdom
As described above, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU in accordance with Article 50 
of the TEU would not affect the UK’s status as a Contracting Party to the EEA Agree-
ment. On one hand, both the rights and the obligations arising from the Agreement 
for each of its Contracting Parties would accordingly continue to benefit and bind the 
UK. The main difference concerns the scope of EEA rights and obligations applicable 
to the UK: As Article 2(c) of the EEA Agreement106 would no longer apply to the 
UK, it would now be responsible for all rights and obligations emanating from EEA 
law, also for those that hitherto concerned the EC/EU. In short, the post-Brexit UK 
would be a ‘full’ Contracting Party, its legal position insofar being similar to that of 
the three EFTA States Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
On the other hand, all rights and obligations under the EEA Agreement would 
continue for all other EEA Contracting Parties (the EU, the 27 remaining EU States 
and the three EFTA States) in relationship to the UK.
5.1.1. Effect on Rules of European Business Law
In outlining the effects of the UK’s continuing EEA membership on rules of European 
business law, it is helpful to distinguish between rules contained in the EEA Agree-
104 Giegerich, op. cit. supra n 96 at para. 14.
105 Werner Meng, Artikel 50 EUV in Hans von der Groeben, Jürgen Schwarze and Armin Hatje eds, 
Europäisches Unionsrecht, para. 6 (7th ed.; Baden-Baden; Nomos 2015).
106 See 4.4.3 above.
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ment’s main text (those rules resembling EEA ‘primary law’) and rules contained in 
the various Annexes to the Agreement (resembling EEA ‘secondary law’).
Many of the rules applicable to European businesses found in the main text of the 
EEA Agreement, as notably the fundamental freedoms (Articles 8–45 of the EEA 
Agreement), are ‘identical in substance’107 to the corresponding rules in the TFEU, 
although their respective wording may differ somewhat.108 UK companies doing busi-
ness in the EEA would therefore continue to profit from the EEA Agreement’s fun-
damental freedoms in mostly the same manner as they enjoyed the TFEU’s 
fundamental freedoms prior to Brexit. At the same time, companies from other EEA 
States would continue to profit from the EEA Agreement’s fundamental freedoms in 
their transaction with UK-based business partners. The resulting state of affairs will 
be described in more detail below, using as an example the free movement of UK 
companies.109 In addition, certain differences between the EU and the EEA funda-
mental freedoms will also be addressed, focusing on the restrictions to the free move-
ment of workers admissible under EEA primary law.110
The wide range of European business law rules created within the EU through EU 
secondary law (mainly regulations or directives) would cease to be binding on the 
UK once Brexit takes effect.111 As far as EU directives have been implemented into 
UK domestic law, Articles 288(3) and 291 of the TFEU would no longer require the 
UK to maintain the implementing provisions and to apply them. However, as most 
rules of EU secondary law relevant to the EEA have been included into the Annexes 
of the EEA Agreement, these rules would continue to be binding on the UK by virtue 
of Article 7 of the Agreement, albeit in form of EEA law. The same would be true 
for future EU secondary law, as long as it is adopted as EEA law through an amend-
ment of the Annexes in accordance with Article 102 of the EEA Agreement.112 In 
short, many of the secondary legal acts on European business law would essentially 
apply as before, as long and as far as they have been implemented into UK domestic 
law.113 Nevertheless, certain differences between EU law proper and EEA law exist, 
107 See Article 6 of the EEA Agreement.
108 On the free movement of workers under the EEA Agreement, see 5.1.2 below.
109 See 5.1.1.1 below.
110 See 5.1.2 below.
111 Basedow, op. cit. supra note 54 at 570.
112 See further 5.3.2.3 below.
113 What rules of EU secondary law provenance will continue to apply within the UK after Brexit 
is a matter to be decided by UK law (see Basedow, op. cit. supra note 54 at 570). In case of domestic 
law implementing EU directives, much is to be said for an assumption in favour of these domestic 
laws’ application (compare Alexander Thiele, Der Austritt der EU – Hintergründe und rechtliche Rah-
menbedingungen eines ‚Brexit‘, Europarecht 281 at 301–2 (2016)). The case is more difficult as far as 
EU regulations are concerned, because Article 288(2) of the TFEU declares regulations to be directly 
applicable only ‘in all [EU] Member States’, which a post-Brexit UK will no longer be. Accordingly, a 
UK law governing the post-Brexit applicability of EU regulations will be needed, which could say that 
the content of EU regulations shall continue to apply, unless UK law provides otherwise.
ULRICH G. SCHROETER AND HEINRICH NEMECZEK944
as will be demonstrated below with respect to the European ‘passport’ for UK credit 
institutions and investment firms.114
5.1.1.1. In Particular: Free Movement for United Kingdom Companies
One important effect of the UK remaining part of the EEA after Brexit concerns 
companies that are incorporated in the UK under UK law (mostly as private compa-
nies limited by shares or public limited companies), but have their actual centre of 
administration in a different EU Member State and predominantly or exclusively carry 
out their business from this other State. In such a situation, the company seat princi-
ple (Sitztheorie) that is the prevailing conflict of laws approach in a number of EU 
States would generally result in the company’s legal capacity being determined by 
reference to the law applicable in th e place where its actual centre of administration 
(its ‘real seat’) is established.115 Despite their valid incorporation under UK law, 
companies with their actual centre of administration outside of the UK would there-
fore be denied legal capacity unless they have been reincorporated in the place of 
their actual centre of administration in such a way as to acquire legal capacity under 
the latter law. The ECJ has prevented this result by holding in landmark cases like 
Centros,116 Überseering117 and Inspire Art118 that the freedom of establishment under 
Articles 49 and 54 of the TFEU requires all EU Member States to recognise the legal 
capacity which a company formed in accordance with the law of another EU Member 
State in which it has its registered office enjoys under the law of its State of incorpo-
ration.
Some authors have argued that the cross-border mobility of UK companies result-
ing from their freedom of establishment under the TFEU would be lost once Brexit 
occurs, since Articles 49 and 54 of the TFEU no longer apply.119 As a result, inter 
alia limitations of liability under UK company law would no longer apply, potentially 
resulting in an unlimited personal liability of shareholders for company debts.120 How-
ever, this view overlooks that due to the UK’s continuing status as a Contracting Party 
of the EEA Agreement, the freedom of establishment under Articles 31 and 34 of the 
114 See 5.1.1.2 below.
115 See in more detail Werner F Ebke, The ‘Real Seat’ Doctrine in the Conflict of Corporate Laws 
36 Foreign Law Year in Review 1015 (2002); Eddy Wymeersch, The Transfer of the Company’s Seat 
in European Company Law, ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, Working Paper No. 08/2003; Nicole 
Rothe, Freedom of Establishment of Legal Persons Within the European Union: An Analysis of the 
European Court of Justice Decision in the Überseering Case 53 American University Law Review 
1103 (2004).
116 ECJ, Judgment of 9 March 1999, Case C-212/97 [1999] ECR I-1459, para. 39 – Centros.
117 ECJ, Judgement of 5 November 2002, Case C-208/00 [2002] ECR I-9919, paras 94–95 – Über-
seering.
118 ECJ, Judgment of 30 September 2003, Case C-167/01 [2003] ECR I-512, paras 95–105 – Inspire 
Art.
119 Hess, op. cit. supra note 35 at 417–8; Seeger, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1819–21; Weller, Thomale 
and Benz, op. cit. supra note 3, at 2380; also Basedow, op. cit. supra note 54 at 570.
120 Hess, op. cit. supra note 35 at 418; Seeger, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1819; Weller, Thomale and 
Benz, op. cit. supra note 3, at 2381.
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EEA Agreement would remain unaffected by Brexit. As the EFTA Court held in 
Arcade Drilling,121 Articles 31 and 34 of the EEA Agreement guarantee the cross-
border mobility of companies within the EEA in the same manner as Articles 49 and 
54 of the TFEU within the EU.122 Domestic courts in EU Member States, for example 
in Germany,123 have adopted the same interpretation of the EEA Agreement, and 
commentators agree.124 Accordingly, UK companies with their ‘real seat’ elsewhere 
within the EEA would remain unaffected by Brexit, as their legal capacity under UK 
law has to be recognised in all other EEA States due to Articles 31 and 34 of the EEA 
Agreement.
5.1.1.2. In Particular: European ‘Passport’ for United Kingdom Credit Institutions 
and Investment Firms
Under current EU financial markets rules, credit institutions125 and investment firms126 
authorised in one EEA Member State are entitled to also carry out their business in 
any other EEA Member State, either by establishing a branch or by providing services. 
Due to these so-called ‘passporting rights’,127 credit institutions and investment firms 
(‘institutions’ in EU parlance)128 that want to conduct activities in other EEA States 
are not required to obtain a domestic banking license from the host state authority, 
121 EFTA Court, Judgment of 3 October 2012, Case E-15/11, paras 41 and 46 – Arcade Drilling 
AS v. Norway.
122 On the ‘homogeneity objective’ in interpreting the freedom of establishment under the TFEU 
and under the EEA Agreement, see also EFTA Court, Advisory Opinion of 10 December 1998, Case 
E-3/98, paras 15–21 – Herbert Rainford-Towning; EFTA Court, Judgment of 1 July 2005, Case E-8/04, 
para. 17 – EFTA Surveillance Authority v. The Principality of Liechtenstein.
123 See Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court), Judgment of 19 September 2005 – II 
ZR 372/03, 164 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen 148.
124 Carl Baudenbacher and Dirk Buschle, Niederlassungsfreiheit für EWR-Gesellschaften nach Über-
seering, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 26–31 (2004); Peter Kindler, Inter-
nationales Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht in Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 
Vol. 11, para. 837 (6th ed.; Munich; CH Beck 2015); Wienand Meilicke, Die Niederlassungsfreiheit 
nach „Überseering“, Die GmbH-Rundschau 793 at 798 (2003); Wulf-Henning Roth, Niederlassungs- 
und Dienstleistungsfreiheit: Grundregeln in Manfred Dauses ed, Handbuch des EU-Wirtschaftsrechts, 
para. 51 (40th suppl.; Munich; CH Beck 2015); Philipp Speitler, Right of Establishment and Freedom 
to Provide and Receive Services in Carl Baudenbacher ed, The Handbook of EEA Law, 459 (Cham, 
Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London; Springer, 2016).
125 See Article 4(1) point 1 of the Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms … 
(OJ L 176, 27 June 2013, 1) (Credit Requirements Regulation, ‘CRR’).
126 See Article 4(1) point 1 of the Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments … (OJ L 145, 30 April 2004, 1) (Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive I, ‘MiFID I’).
127 Articles 33–46 of the Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and investment firms … (OJ L 176, 27 June 2013, 338) (Capital Requirements Directive IV, 
‘CRD IV’) as regards credit institutions; Articles 31 and 32 of the MiFID I as regards investment firms.
128 Article 4(1) point 3 of the CRR.
ULRICH G. SCHROETER AND HEINRICH NEMECZEK946
but only need to inform their home state regulator129 who remains primarily respon-
sible for their supervision. With a European ‘passport’, an institution therefore only 
needs a banking license in its home state in order to gain access to the entire EEA. 
Domestic laws implementing European passport rules require that an institution has 
its place of business in the EEA, but not necessarily in the EU.130 If the post-Brexit 
UK remained in the EEA, British institutions would therefore continue to have pass-
porting rights in other EEA States, and institutions from other EEA States would vice 
versa still have privileged access to the British financial market (inward passporting).131
Difficulties could nevertheless arise in this context, because passporting rights 
implicitly presuppose that (minimum) harmonized standards of financial regulation 
apply to all institutions concerned.132 Domestic laws therefore make a passport depen-
dent on the foreign financial institution e.g. being ‘supervised by the competent 
authorities of the home State in accordance with the directives issued by the European 
Union’.133 Whether the latter requirement is fulfilled in the UK may be doubted once 
Brexit has taken place: Although CRR, CRD IV and MiFID I are all EU legal acts 
with EEA relevance,134 only MiFID I has yet been incorporated into Annex IX of the 
EEA Agreement, where EU secondary law on financial services applicable in the EEA 
is listed.135 In contrast, the Annex mentions neither CRR nor CRD IV as being part 
of EEA law, and supervisory authorities of the EEA’s ‘non-EU pillar’ accordingly 
do not have to act in accordance with these directives. Does this mean that UK credit 
institutions after Brexit – although still domiciled in an EEA State (the UK) – would 
no longer be supervised ‘in accordance with the directives issued by the EU’, thus 
risking to lose their passporting rights?
Subject to certain conditions, this should not be the case, with UK passporting 
rights remaining unaffected by Brexit. The reasons are two-fold: As far as the CRD 
IV is concerned, its rules have already been implemented into UK domestic law. As 
long as the UK legislator would leave the implementing provisions in force after 
Brexit,136 with UK law accordingly exceeding the requirements of the then applicable 
EEA law, no difficulties would arise. The situation is somewhat more complex as far 
129 Articles 35(1) and 39(1) of the CRD IV regarding credit institutions; Articles 31(2) and 32(2) of 
the MiFID I regarding investment firms. 
130 See e.g. Section 53b(1) first sentence of the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz); Sched-
ule 3 point 12(1) of the British Financial Services Markets Act 2000.
131 Assuming that Schedule 3 Part II of the British Financial Markets Act 2000 setting out the 
requirements for the exercise of passport rights in the UK remains in force without any changes.
132 Cf. Markus Möstl, Preconditions and Limits of Mutual Recognition 47 Common Market Law 
Review 405 at 413–8 (2010); Christine Janssens, The Principle of Mutual Recognition, 88 (Oxford; 
Oxford University Press 2013).
133 Section 53b(1) first sentence of the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz) (translation by 
the authors).
134 See Francesco A Schurr and Johannes Gasser, Financial Services Law in Carl Baudenbacher ed, 
The Handbook of EEA Law, 667–8 (Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London; Springer, 2016) 
on MiFID I; see also Baur, op. cit. supra note 71 at 53–6 on the notion of EEA relevance.
135 Point 31ba of Annex IX of the EEA Agreement.
136 See in general supra n 113.
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as CRR is concerned, because its provisions would simply cease to apply in the UK 
the moment Brexit takes effect, given that it is a directly applicable EU regulation 
(Article 288(2) of the TFEU) that did not have to and has not been implemented into 
UK law. The UK legislator would therefore need to make the CRR’s rules a part of 
post-Brexit UK domestic law137 in order to guarantee an EU-equivalent standard of 
supervision. It could do so e.g. by declaring the CRR applicable to institutions who 
wish to use passporting rights (possibly offering a second ‘lighter touch’ regime for 
institutions not interested in a passport), provided that such a declaration is sufficiently 
clear and precise.138
Even if post-Brexit UK supervisory law would not comprise the CRD IV and/or 
the CRR, any refusal of foreign supervisory authorities to recognise UK institutions’ 
passporting rights would in principle infringe EEA law, as long as the UK has at least 
implemented CRD I–III.139 These directives – predecessors to CRD IV and CRR – are 
listed in Annex IX to the EEA Agreement140 and contain the only harmonized capital 
requirements for credit institutions141 currently binding on non-EU EEA States. As 
long as CRD IV and CRR neither have been made part of EEA law nor Annex IX 
pertaining to capital requirements has been provisionally suspended in accordance 
with Article 102(4)–(6) of the EEA Agreement,142 compliance with CRD I–III must 
therefore be regarded sufficient for granting UK credit institutions an EEA passport.
5.1.2. The United Kingdom and the Free Movement of Workers
One of the most controversial political issues during the campaign preceding the 
referendum about Brexit was the freedom of movement for workers granted by 
Article 45 of the TFEU, and the resulting influx of foreign EU nationals into the UK 
that had resulted therefrom. Against this background, the free movement of workers 
under the EEA Agreement and how it can be influenced by the UK are viewed as 
particularly important whenever the post-Brexit UK’s position within the EEA is 
assessed.143
137 See already supra n 113.
138 For the correct transposition of a directive into domestic law see ECJ, Judgment of 28 February 
1991, Case C-131/88 [1991] ECR I-865, para. 6 – Commission v. Germany; ECJ, Judgment 30 May 
1991, Case C-361/88 [1991] ECR I-2596, para. 15 – Commission v. Germany; ECJ, Judgment of 13 
December 2007, Case C-418/04 [2007] ECR I-10997, para. 158 – Commission v. Ireland.
139 See for a different view in case of the incorporation of a new legal act that only defines and 
gives concrete expression to already existing provisions of EEA law Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen, 
EEA Main Agreement and Secondary EU Law Incorporated into the Annexes and Protocols in Carl 
Baudenbacher ed, The Handbook of EEA Law, 108–9 (Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, Lon-
don; Springer, 2016).
140 Points 14 and 31 of Annex IX of the EEA Agreement.
141 See Articles 25(3) and 30(1) of the Directive 2006/48/EC.
142 See in more detail 5.3.2.3 below.
143 See inter alia Basedow, op. cit. supra note 54 at 569.
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5.1.2.1. Content of the Freedom of Movement for Workers under the EEA 
Agreement
Much like Article 45 of the TFEU, Article 28 of the EEA Agreement provides that 
‘freedom of movement for workers shall be secured’ among EC States and EFTA 
States. There is general agreement that the content of this freedom is at the outset144 
to be interpreted similarly under both treaties.145 The post-Brexit UK’s non-member-
ship in regards of both the EU and the EFTA would not affect its application to the 
UK146 although Article 28 of the EEA Agreement speaks of free movement ‘among 
EC Member States and EFTA States’, because these terms – as outlined earlier147 – 
are to be interpreted as referring to EU States and non-EU States within the EEA. In 
addition, EU secondary law on workers’ free movement has been adopted as EEA 
law and therefore also applies to the EEA’s ‘non-EU pillar’.148
A partial difference between EU and EEA may result from Article 20(1) of the 
TFEU establishing a ‘citizenship of the Union’, making every person holding the 
nationality of an EU Member State also a citizen of the EU. Articles 20(2)(a) and 21 
of the TFEU give every EU citizen the right to move and reside freely within the ter-
ritory of the Member States, thereby creating a more general free movement right in 
addition to the free movement for workers under Article 45 of the TFEU. (As always, 
this right can only be exercised in accordance with the conditions and limits defined 
by the EU primary and secondary law.149 Nevertheless, the ECJ has based certain 
rights of residence directly on Article 21(1) of the TFEU.)150 In contrast, no compa-
rable general right of free movement is granted by the EEA Agreement, because no 
‘EEA citizenship’ exists. This is in conformity with the lesser degree of integration 
aimed at by the EEA’s Contracting Parties.151 In spite of this difference, recent case-
law of the EFTA Court (in Clauder)152 has been interpreted by some authors as 
‘clearly’ laying ‘the substantive foundations for a comprehensive right to move and 
reside freely granted to all citizens of EEA countries’, thereby resembling a ‘EEA 
144 On ‘safeguard measures’ allowed only under the EEA Agreement, see 5.1.2.2 below.
145 ECJ, Judgment of 10 May 2012, Case C-39/10, para. 67 – Commission v. Estonia; ECJ, Judgment 
of 23 September 2003, Case C-452/01 [2003] ECR I-9743, paras 27–30 – Margarethe Ospelt; EFTA 
Court, Judgment of 26 July 2016, Case E-28/15, para. 60 – Yankuba Jabbi v. Norway; Advocate General 
Kokott, Opinion of 21 March 2013, Case C-431/11, para. 17 – UK v. Council; Friedl Weiss and Clemens 
Kaupa, European Union Internal Market Law, 149 (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
146 On the EEA Agreement’s territorial scope of application to the post-Brexit UK, see further 
5.1.3 below.
147 See 4.4.1 above.
148 See EFTA Court, Judgment of 26 July 2011, Case E-4/11 – Clauder (on Directive 2004/38/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union 
and their family members to move and reside freely with the territory of the Member States [OJ L 258, 
30 April 2004, 77] and its application to Liechtenstein).
149 Article 20(2) of the TFEU in fine.
150 See, concerning a right of residence for third-party nationals that had no such right under Arti-
cle 45 of the TFEU or under EU secondary law, ECJ, Judgment of 12 March 2014, Case C-456/12, 
paras 44, 48, 50, 61 – O. and B.
151 See already above at 2.1.
152 EFTA Court, Judgment of 26 July 2011, Case E-4/11, paras 33–34, 43, 46–49 – Clauder.
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citizenship’153 – an understanding that seems doubtful, but cannot be further investi-
gated here.
5.1.2.2. Possibility for the United Kingdom to take Safeguard Measures
In any case, there is yet another important difference between the free movement of 
workers under the TFEU and its counterpart under the EEA Agreement, namely the 
possibility granted by Article 112 of the EEA Agreement to take so-called ‘safeguard 
measures’. According to Article 112(1), ‘[i]f serious economic, societal or environ-
mental difficulties of a sectorial or regional nature liable to persist are arising, a Con-
tracting Party may unilaterally take appropriate measures […]’ in order to limit the 
freedom under the EEA Agreement giving rise to such difficulties. ‘Such safeguard 
measures shall be restricted with regard to their scope and duration to what is strictly 
necessary in order to remedy the situation. Priority shall be given to such measures 
as will least disturb the functioning of this Agreement’ (Article 112(2) of the 
Agreement).154
The safeguard rules in Articles 112–114 of the EEA Agreement are of a defensive 
character, and are applied to protect an EEA State against a disproportionate effect 
of certain market freedoms.155 The free movement of workers within the EEA is one 
of those freedoms. Safeguard provisions are common in trade agreements,156 but – and 
this is important – no similar measures are allowed under the TFEU’s freedom of 
movement for workers.157 Article 112 of the EEA Agreement therefore provides the 
UK with a possibility to regulate the influx of foreign workers in a manne r unknown 
under the TFEU, subject to certain conditions.
With regard to the particular situation of the post-Brexit UK, it is particularly rel-
evant that Article 112(1) of the EEA Agreement does not only allow safeguard mea-
sures in case of serious economic or environmental difficulties, but also lists ‘serious 
societal difficulties’ as a sufficient reason for such measures. As appropriate safeguard 
measures may furthermore be taken ‘unilaterally’ by one Contracting Party, no agree-
ment with the other EEA States is needed.
In past practice under the EEA Agreement, Liechtenstein has applied safeguard 
measures making entry, residence and employment of citizens of other EEA States 
subject to prior authorisation. These restrictions were subsequently incorporated into 
Annex V (free movement of workers) and Annex VIII (right of establishment) of the 
153 Burri and Pirker, op. cit. supra note 13 at 11–14.
154 Article 112(3) of the EEA Agreement further provides that safeguard measures shall apply with 
regard to all Contracting Parties. Conditions and procedures to be followed are laid down in Article 113 
of the EEA Agreement.
155 Georges Baur, Suspension of Parts of the EEA Agreement: Disputes about Incorporation, Conse-
quences of Failure to Reach Agreement and Safeguard Measures in Carl Baudenbacher ed,.The Hand-
book of EEA Law, 69 at 82 (Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London; Springer, 2016).
156 Norberg, Hökborg, Johansson, Eliasson and Dedichen, op. cit. supra note 20 at 287.
157 Regarding the EEC Treaty Norberg, Hökborg, Johansson, Eliasson and Dedichen, op. cit. supra 
note 20 at 287.
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EEA Agreement.158 This could be viewed as a precedent for a possible quota system 
to be imposed by the UK in the future. The foreseeable counter-argument is that 
Liechtenstein’s situation was different from that of the UK, although it is uncertain 
whether the undoubtable differences between the two cases prevent the UK from 
making use of Article 112. In addition, safeguard measures under the EEA Agreement 
have in the past been used by the EC, namely against the import of farmed Norwegian 
salmon.159
In any case, the use of safeguard measures under the EEA Agreement may come 
at a price. If such a measure creates an imbalance between the rights and obligations 
under this Agreement, Article 114(1) of the Agreement authorizes other Contracting 
Parties to take such proportionate ‘rebalancing measures’ as are strictly necessary to 
remedy the imbalance. Priority shall be given to such measures as will least disturb 
the functioning of the EEA. As a consequence, other EEA States could employ rebal-
ancing measures towards the UK under the conditions laid down in Article 114 of the 
EEA Agreement.
In summary, while the conditions for the application of safeguard measures under 
Articles 112–114 of the EEA Agreement have been characterised as ‘very strict’,160 
they remain significantly less strict than the TFEU’s legal regime that does not allow 
such measures at all. Given that many terms in the EEA Agreement’s relevant provi-
sions are rather vague, disagreements about the exact conditions for safeguard mea-
sures appear likely. At the end of the day, these disagreements will only be settled 
before the competent courts or – maybe more desirably – through political negotia-
tions between the EEA Contracting Parties.
5.1.3. EEA Agreement’s Territorial Scope of Application in the United Kingdom
A rather difficult question relates to the territorial scope of application that EEA law 
would have within the UK once Brexit has occurred. The source of the difficulties is 
Article 126(1) of the EEA Agreement, the provision defining the Agreement’s ter-
ritorial scope already mentioned earlier.161 By stipulating that the Agreement shall 
apply ‘to the territories to which the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community is applied and under the conditions laid down in that Treaty’, Arti-
cle 126(1) of the EEA Agreement today refers to Article 355 of the TFEU.162 This 
provision makes the TFEU’s application to certain UK territories (as e.g. the Cayman 
Islands, the British Virgin Islands or Bermuda) subject to special arrangements163 or, 
158 See in more detail Baur, op. cit. supra note 155 at 75.
159 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2907/95 of 15 December 1995 making the release for free 
circulation of salmon of EEA origin conditional upon observance of a floor price (OJ L 304, 16 Decem-
ber 1995, 38).
160 Baur, op. cit. supra note 155 at 75.
161 See above 4.4.2.
162 The EEC Treaty that Article 126(1) of the EEA Agreement still speaks of has long been replaced 
by the EC Treaty and later by the TFEU; see already supra notes 25–26.
163 According to Article 355(2) of the TFEU in conjunction with Annex II, the Cayman Islands, 
Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Montserrat, Pitcairn, Saint Helena and 
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with respect to others (like the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man), to conditions.164 
Once Brexit has taken effect, Article 355 of the TFEU would no longer apply to the 
UK. Does that mean that EEA law would therefore indiscriminately apply to all UK 
territories, including those previously in part exempted by virtue of Article 355 of the 
TFEU?
The customary public international law rule enshrined in Article 29 of the VCLT165 
at first sight seems to speak for a positive answer: In general, ‘a treaty is binding upon 
each party in respect of its entire territory’. However, the provision makes clear that 
this rule applies only ‘[u]nless a different intention appears from the treaty or is oth-
erwise established’. It is submitted that in the post-Brexit situation, such a different 
intention indeed appears from the treaty, namely from Article 126(1) of the EEA 
Agreement and its limited applicability to certain UK territories that this provision 
has always provided for. That Article 126(1) pursues its goal by way of a reference 
to the TFEU is after all merely a matter of legislative technique, with ‘the territories 
to which the [EEC Treaty] is applied and under the conditions laid down in that 
Treaty’ being used as a shorthand description for the rather complicated provisions 
on the EU’s territorial scope. EEA law’s territorial scope was thereby aligned with 
that of EU law, without having to replicate the entire wording of today’s Article 355 
of the TFEU. Accordingly, Article 126(1) of the EEA Agreement demonstrates the 
Contracting Parties’ intention to make EEA law’s application to certain UK territories 
conditional on particular requirements. As Brexit merely results in a reallocation of 
rights and obligations arising from the EEA law between the EU and the UK,166 but 
does not change the content of these rights and obligations, the same must apply with 
respect to EEA law’s territorial scope of application within the UK.
Dependencies, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory, Turks and Caicos Islands, 
British Virgin Islands as well as Bermuda are subject to the special arrangements for association set out 
in Articles 198–204 of the TFEU and the ‘Overseas Association Decision’ (Council Decision 2013/755/
EU of 25 November 2013 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European 
Union (OJ L 344, 19 December 2013, 1).
164 See in detail Article 355(5)(b) and (c) of the TFEU in respect of the UK Sovereign Base Areas 
of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.
165 It is generally accepted that Article 29 of the VCLT codifies customary law; in this sense The 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award of 13 December 2013, PCA Case No. 2013–13, para. 220 – 
Sanum Investments v. Lao; Villiger, op. cit. supra n 41 at 393; Kerstin Odendahl, Art. 29 in Oliver Dörr 
and Kirsten Schmalenbach eds, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, para. 3 
(Berlin, Heidelberg; Springer 2012); Marko Milanovic, The Spatial Dimension: Treaties and Territory 
in Christian J Tams, Antonios Tzanakopoulos and Andreas Zimmermann eds, Research Handbook on 
the Law of Treaties, 186 (Cheltenham, Northampton; Edward Elgar 2014); see also ECJ, Judgment of 
27 February 2002, Case C-37/00 [2002] ECR I-2013, para. 29 – Herbert Weber.
166 See 4.4.3 above.
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5.2. Difficulties Concerning the United Kingdom’s post-Brexit Membership in the 
EEA
The interpretation developed above167 according to which ‘Brexit’ does not terminate 
the UK’s membership in the EEA should not be misunderstood as indicating that no 
difficulties would be raised under the current EEA Agreement by the UK giving up 
its EU membership. Such difficulties would indeed arise, primarily because certain 
institutional arrangements in the Agreement do not explicitly envisage an EEA Con-
tracting Party that is neither a member state of the EU nor of the EFTA.168
5.2.1. Representation of the United Kingdom in EEA Council and EEA Joint 
Committee
This is first and foremost true in case of one of the organs established by the EEA 
Agreement, namely the EEA Council. The EEA Council is, in particular, responsible 
for giving the political impetus in the implementation of the EEA Agreement and 
laying down the general guidelines for the EEA Joint Committee (Article 89(1) of 
the Agreement). According to Article 90(1), the EEA Council consists of the members 
of the Council of the EC and members of the EC Commission, and of one member 
of the Government of each of the EFTA States. As already outlined earlier,169 the 
provision reflects the EEA Agrement’s ‘two pillar’ structure and aims at mirroring 
this structure in the EEA Council’s membership. Accordingly, the term ‘of each of 
the EFTA States’ used in Article 90(1) should be read as ‘of each of the Contracting 
Parties that do not form part of the EU’,170 thereby giving the post-Brexit UK a seat 
in the Council. The rule in Article 90(2) of the EEA Agreement, according to which 
decisions by the EEA Council shall be taken by agreement between the Community, 
on the one hand, and the EFTA States, on the other, does not seem to create difficul-
ties: As there presently is no legal basis for a vote by majority neither in EFTA law 
nor in any other rule applicable to the EEA’s ‘non-EU pillar’, all EEA States that are 
not part of the EU have to be in agreement for the EEA Council to take a decision,171 
including the post-Brexit UK.
The composition of the practically more important172 EEA Joint Committee is at 
the outset framed more openly, with Article 93(1) of the EEA Agreement providing 
that ‘[t]he EEA Joint Committee shall consist of representatives of the Contracting 
Parties.’ The provision thereby easily covers Contracting Parties that are neither a 
member of the EU nor EFTA, and already on its face supports a continued represen-
tation of the post-Brexit UK in the Joint Committee. In contrast, the decision-making 
167 See 4. above.
168 See already 4.4.1 above.
169 See supra note 71.
170 See 4.4.1 above.
171 Cf. Norberg, Hökborg, Johansson, Eliasson and Dedichen, op. cit. supra note 20 at 143.
172 Burri and Pirker, op. cit. supra note 13 at 3 and 15.
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rule in Article 93(2) of the EEA Agreement has been worded along the same lines as 
its counterpart in Article 90(2), and should be interpreted accordingly.
5.2.2. Representation of the United Kingdom in EFTA Court and EFTA 
Surveillance Authority
The UK’s representation in two organs charged with the interpretation and application 
of EEA law – the EFTA Court and the EFTA Surveillance Authority – raises more 
difficult questions.
5.2.2.1. EFTA Court
Within the EEA, the task of maintaining ‘homogeneity’ between EU law and EEA 
law has primarily been entrusted to the ECJ and the EFTA Court, between whom a 
system of cooperation and information (Article 106 of the EEA Agreement) has been 
established. This arrangement is (again) a result of the EEA’s ‘two pillar structure’173 
and was chosen after the initial plan that had aimed at the creation of a single EEA 
Court for the entire EEA had been declared incompatible with the TEEC by the ECJ.174 
It causes particular difficulties as far as the UK’s post-Brexit position is concerned: 
Once the UK’s withdrawal from the EU has automatically terminated the ECJ’s juris-
diction over the UK under the TFEU,175 a solution cannot simply be found through 
an interpretation of the EEA Agreement to which the UK continues to be a Contract-
ing Party, because the EFTA Court was not created by this Agreement. On the con-
trary, the EFTA Court is a creation of the SCA, a separate treaty between (only) 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway (Article 1(b) in conjunction with Article 27 of the 
SCA), to which the UK is not (or not yet) a Contracting Party. A teleological inter-
pretation of the term ‘EFTA States’176 would not be insufficient in this matter, because 
the purposes of the EEA Agreement and the SCA are not identical. In addition, many 
among the SCA’s provisions have a wording specifically tailored to the current num-
ber of Contracting Parties that would be difficult to overcome.
Accordingly, the UK would have to accede to the SCA in order to achieve a rep-
resentation in the EFTA Court. Its accession would likely require an amendment to 
the SCA by agreement among all current SCA Contracting Parties, because Article 51 
of the SCA currently only allows for an accession by EFTA States and other SCA 
provisions (like Article 28 providing for three judges) would also have to be adjusted 
to the new situation.
Should the necessary agreement with Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway not be 
reached or should the UK for other reasons opt against joining the SCA, EEA law 
within the UK would have to be interpreted solely by British domestic courts. Accord-
ing to Article 6 of the EEA Agreement, British courts would have to interpret EEA 
rules in conformity with relevant rulings of the ECJ given prior to the date of the EEA 
173 See 4.4.1 above.
174 See ECJ, Opinion 1/91 of 14 December 1991 [1991] ECR I-6079, para. 53 – EEA Agreement.
175 Articles 258–281 of the TFEU.
176 On this interpretative approach, see already 4.4.1 above.
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Agreement’s signature (in 1992), but would be under no obligation to follow later 
case-law of the ECJ or the EFTA Court. Judgements by UK courts interpreting EEA 
law could arguably be included in the system of exchange of information under 
Article 106 of the EEA Agreement, as the provision’s wording (which includes 
‘Courts of last instance of the EFTA States’) is arguably amenable to be interpreted 
as encompassing Courts of last instance of non-EU EEA States. Finally, Article 107 
of the EEA Agreement in conjunction with Protocol 34 authorises the UK to allow 
its courts to ask the ECJ to decide on the interpretation of EEA law – an option that 
has never been used in the past,177 and it appears unlikely that the UK would do so.
5.2.2.2. EFTA Surveillance Authority
The same difficulties and possible solutions just described with a view towards the 
UK’s post-Brexit representation in the EFTA Court apply mutatis mutandis to the 
EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA), the counterpart to the EU Commission.178 As 
the ESA was similarly not established directly by the EEA Agreement, but through 
Article 4 of the SCA exclusively between Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, the 
UK’s representation therein would again require a respective amendment to the SCA.179 
Until then, surveillance of the fulfilment of obligations under EEA Agreement (Arti-
cle 109(1) of the Agreement) by and in the UK will have to be conducted by an inde-
pendent180 UK domestic authority. This authority would also be responsible for 
ensuring the application of the competition rules in Articles 53–64 of the Agreement. 
Whether the provisions on the cooperation between the EU Commission and the ESA 
in Article 109(2)–(5) of the Agreement can be interpreted as also including their future 
UK counterpart is uncertain, but arguably not impossible.
5.3. ‘No Seat at the Table’: The United Kingdom and Future EU Secondary Law
One of the major disadvantages of a mere EEA membership, as opposed to an EU 
membership, is the lack of involvement of non-EU EEA Contracting Parties in the 
making of EU secondary law.
5.3.1. The Problem
Under the ordinary legislative procedure, EU regulations and directives are proposed 
by the EU Commission181 and jointly adopted by the EU Council and the EU Parlia-
ment.182 According to Article 102(1) of the EEA Agreement, EU secondary law then 
177 It seems to be a rather theoretical possibility that is of merely symbolic nature, see Baudenbacher, 
op. cit. supra n 19 at 152.
178 After Brexit, the EU Commission would no longer be competent to oversee the fulfilment of 
obligations by the UK in accordance with Article 17(1) third sentence of the TEU and Article 258 of 
the TFEU.
179 Frank Büchel and Xavier Lewis, The EFTA Surveillance Authority in Carl Baudenbacher ed, The 
Handbook of EEA Law, 113 at 114 (Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London; Springer, 2016).
180 Article 108(1) of the EEA Agreement.
181 Articles 289(1) and 294(2) of the TFEU.
182 Articles 289(1) and 294(3)–(14) of the TFEU.
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generally has to be made part of EEA law by way of a corresponding amendment to 
the Annexes to the EEA Agreement, although the non-EU EEA Contracting Parties 
did not have a vote during the adoption of the respective EU regulations or directives. 
This weakness of non-EU EEA members’ position is frequently being pointed out 
when a post-Brexit EEA membership of the UK is discussed, often under the catch-
word ‘no seat at the table’.183
5.3.2. Discussion
The fact that non-EU Contracting Parties within the EEA – including the UK after 
Brexit – have no decisive say in the making of those EU legal acts that ‘homogenous’ 
EEA law will later be modelled after, ranks indeed as an important difference between 
the position of EU States and that of ‘mere’ EEA States.184 Nevertheless, the discus-
sion’s primary or even exclusive focus on the decision-making process within the EU 
Council runs the risk of exaggerating this difference, for a number of reasons:
5.3.2.1. Involvement in the Decision-Shaping Process
First, although there is no seat for non-EU EEA States at the ministerial table of the 
EU Council, there is a certain involvement of these States at the drafting stage of EU 
secondary law (during the ‘decision-shaping process’)185, albeit at the (mere) expert 
level. To this end, Article 99(1) of the EEA Agreement provides that the EU Com-
mission, as soon as it draws up new legislation in a field governed by the Agreement, 
shall informally seek advice from experts of the EFTA States (i.e. the non-EU EEA 
States)186 in the same way as it seeks advice from experts of the EC Member States 
for the elaboration of its proposals.187 Throughout the drafting process, EEA States 
of the non-EU pillar are furthermore continuously to be kept informed and consulted, 
Article 99(2)–(4) of the EEA Agreement. While these information and consultation 
rights fall short of an actual vote in the adoption of a EU legal act,188 they do guaran-
tee a certain involvement of a post-Brexit UK in the making of future EU secondary 
law.
183 House of Commons Foreign Affair Committee, The Future of the European Union: UK Gov-
ernment Policy, First Report of Session 2013–14, Volume II, 174 (London; 2013); The Law Society of 
England and Wales, Alternatives to the EU 2 (September 2016); CBI, Our Global Future: The Business 
Vision for a Reformed EU, 16 (2013); Basedow, op. cit. supra note 54 at 569; Dhingra and Sampson, 
op. cit. supra n 3 at 1; Mary Dejevsky, Brexit could finally spark reform of the EU, Independent, 3 July 
2016; see also Johanna Jonsdottir, Europeanization and the European Economic Area, Iceland’s par-
ticipation in the EU’s Policy Process, 162 (London and New York; Routledge 2013); Jacques Pelkmans 
and Philipp Böhler, The EEA Review and Liechtenstein’s Integration Strategy 25 (Centre for European 
Policy Studies; Brussels 2013).
184 Norberg and Johansson, op. cit. supra note 90 at 41: ‘major weakness of the EEA Agreement’.
185 Baur, op. cit. supra note 71 at 47.
186 See 4.4.1 above.
187 However, the EU Commission remains entirely free in deciding whether to seek advice from 
experts, and which experts to consult; see Norberg, Hökborg, Johansson, Eliasson and Dedichen, op. 
cit. supra note 20 at 136.
188 See Burri and Pirker, op. cit. supra note 13 at 15: ‘minimal possibility to influence the content 
of legislation to be transposed later on …’.
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5.3.2.2. Limited Influence also Under the Current TFEU
Second, and maybe more importantly, the picture of a ‘seat at the table’ should not 
be misconstrued as individual EU States possessing a general possibility to prevent 
unwanted EU secondary law from being adopted. Such a ‘veto’ right did exist in the 
earlier years of the EEC/EC, when the EEC/EC Treaties then in force often required 
a unanimous vote in the Council. However, over the past decades the scope for deci-
sions by the Council acting by a mere majority has gradually been expanded, most 
notably through the 2007 Lisbon Treaty: Today, EU regulations and directives in 
most areas can be adopted within the Council by a majority of the votes, thereby no 
longer securing a veto right for every EU State. And the more recent practice shows 
that the UK has been outvoted multiple times when contentious and controversial EU 
secondary law was adopted, although it still had its ‘seat at the table’; the EU rules 
introducing a financial transaction tax189 and imposing a cap on bankers’ bonuses190 
being only two of the recent cases that come to mind. When the rights of non-EU 
EEA States are not compared with the rights of EC States in 1994, but rather with 
those of EU States in 2016, the differences may accordingly appear less pronounced.
5.3.2.3. Unanimity Required in the EEA Joint Committee
Third, the EEA Agreement itself provides non-EU EEA States with influence on the 
rules that are enacted in the EEA, because decisions taken by the EEA Joint Commit-
tee on amendments to the Annexes to the EEA Agreement (Article 102(1) of EEA 
Agreement) require a unanimous vote of all EEA States (Article 93(2) of the 
Agreement).191 While this requirement may not give non-EU EEA States a right to 
‘opt out’ as such,192 the UK’s possibility to avoid entirely unwanted EU rules is argu-
ably broader under the EEA Agreement than under the TFEU.
In light of the importance of homogeneity between EU law and EEA law,193 Arti-
cle 102(3)–(6) of the EEA Agreement demands all EEA States to make every effort 
to reach the necessary agreement, and regard ‘the affected part’ of an Annex as ‘pro-
visionally suspended’ if the adoption of a given EU law should exceptionally meet 
with a persistent veto. The difficulty to determine its exact scope194 and its precise 
practical consequences may make such a provisional suspension particularly undesir-
able; until today, no suspension has ever occurred.195 In addition, the ‘acquired rights’ 
rule in Article 102(6) second sentence of the EEA Agreement (‘The rights and obli-
189 See ECJ, Judgment of 30 April 2014, Case C-209/13 – UK v. Council.
190 See ECJ, Judgment of 9 December 2014, Case C-507/13 – UK v. Parliament and Council.
191 See 5.2.1 above.
192 This point is stressed by Knut Almestad, The Notion of ‘Opting Out’ in Carl Baudenbacher ed,.
The Handbook of EEA Law, 89 (Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London; Springer, 2016).
193 EFTA Court, Judgment of 16 December 1994, Case E-1/94, paras 32–35 – Ravintoloitsijain 
Liiton Kustannus Oy Restamark; Baur, op. cit. supra note 71 at 48; Páll Hreinsson, General Principles 
in Carl Baudenbacher ed, The Handbook of EEA Law, 350–5 (Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, 
London; Springer, 2016). 
194 See Baur, op. cit. supra note 155 at 72.
195 Baur, op. cit. supra note 155 at 73.
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gations which individuals and economic operators have already acquired under this 
Agreement shall remain’) limits its effects to the future, thereby making a ‘veto’ a 
viable option if a new EU law should be regarded as an unacceptable change for the 
worse.
5.3.3. Conclusion
At the end of the day, the ‘no seat at the table’ picture may somewhat over-simplify 
the position of non-EU EEA States as far as future EU secondary law is concerned. 
While some authors have considered it ‘clear that it would be extremely difficult for 
a major State, like the United Kingdom, in case of a withdrawal from the EU, to accept 
such a solution’,196 the possibilities for a post-Brexit UK to exercise influence on 
future changes in EEA law may be greater than they at first appear. Whether the – 
undoubtedly remaining – weaknesses in comparison with a full EU membership are 
too high a price to pay for Brexit remains primarily a political question, not a legal 
one.
5.4. The United Kingdom and the Financial Mechanism
Finally, the UK has agreed with all other EEA Contracting Parties on the need to 
reduce the economic and social disparities between the regions of the EEA, Arti-
cle 115 first sentence of the EEA Agreement. This aim is pursued through financial 
contributions to economically weaker EEA Member States, either within the EU197 
(where the funding is delivered through the European Regional Development Fund, 
the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund) or, within the EEA’s non-EU pil-
lar, through the so-called ‘Financial Mechanism’ (Article 116 of the EEA Agreement 
and Protocols 38–38c). For the period 2014–2021, the financial contributions by Ice-
land, Liechtenstein and Norway through the Financial Mechanism amount to EUR 
1548,10 million.198
Once the UK has withdrawn from the EU, it will no longer contribute to the EU 
funds mentioned above. At the same time, neither Article 116 of the Agreement nor 
Protocol 38c explicitly provide for an obligation of the UK to contribute to the Finan-
cial Mechanism – not surprisingly, because they were adopted when the UK was still 
a paying EU Member State. However, if one accepts the approach developed earlier 
and interprets the term ‘EFTA States’ as ‘the EEA’s current non-EU pillar‘,199 the 
196 Norberg and Johansson, op. cit. supra note 90 at 41.
197 Articles 174–178 of the TFEU, Articles 175–180 of the Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 
966/2012 and in particular Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013 and No 1303/2013 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 17 December 2013 (OJ L 347, 20 December 2013, 320). 
198 Article 2(1) of the Protocol 38c on the EEA Financial Mechanism (2014–2021). A yet differ-
ent financial contribution of the EFTA States concerns the cooperation under Articles 78–88 of the 
EEA Agreement, with its requirements being set out in Article 82(1) of the Agreement and Protocol 
32 (for further details see Norberg, Hökborg, Johansson, Eliasson and Dedichen, op. cit. supra note 20 
at 644–6).
199 See 4.4.1 above.
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same interpretation must apply to Article 116 of the Agreement, resulting to the post-
Brexit UK having to contribute to the Financial Mechanism. As the exact amount of 
the UK’s contribution is neither fixed in Articles 115–117 of the Agreement nor in 
the Protocols 38–38c, it will be necessary to adjust the relevant provisions accordingly 
by way of an agreement among all EEA Contracting Parties.
6. Summary and Conclusion
The upcoming ‘Brexit’ raises the question what effect the UK’s withdrawal from the 
EU will have on its membership in the EEA. As has been demonstrated in the present 
article, the effect is at the same time less far-reaching and less uncertain than it at first 
appeared: The UK will continue to be a Contracting Party of the EEA Agreement200 
(unless the UK government makes a clear notification of withdrawal also from the 
EEA)201, thereby largely preserving the access of UK companies to the EEA common 
market. As a consequence, a European ‘passport’ for credit institutions and invest-
ment firms based in the UK will continue to be available, subject to an ongoing con-
formity of UK financial market regulation with EU principles.202
While the legal difficulties caused by the UK‘s change from the EEA Agreement’s 
‘EU pillar’ to its ‘non-EU pillar‘ can mostly be solved by way of a teleological inter-
pretation of the Agreement’s provisions,203 a number of treaty provisions will arguably 
have to be adapted,204 requiring an agreement with the other EEA or EFTA States. In 
any case, the EEA membership of a UK that is neither a member of the EU nor of 
EFTA would certainly commence a new phase in the EEA’s practice, given that its 
non-EU pillar would be significantly expanded and that the UK’s economy is much 
larger than those of all EFTA States combined.
A yet different type of uncertainty arises from the political factors that will inevi-
tably influence the negotiations between the EU and the UK about their future rela-
tionship. The UK’s membership in the EEA is likely to play a role in these negotiations, 
although the political perspectives on its relevance and desirability may differ: While 
representatives of the EU may view the UK’s essentially continuing access to the EU 
internal market as an undesirable reduction of a withdrawal’s deterrent effects, EEA 
States for whom the UK is an important trading partner may appreciate their own 
continuing access to the British markets. For the UK itself an ongoing EEA member-
ship will certainly be a welcome starting point for the upcoming negotiations, and 
could also serve as a suitable framework for the UK’s post-Brexit development of its 
intra-European trade.
200 See 4. and 5.1 above.
201 See 3.1 above.
202 See 5.1.1.2 above.
203 See 4. above, in particularly 4.4.1.
204 See 5.2. and 5.4.
